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I.

INTRODUCTION

For the past seven years, bankruptcy experts have watched
from the sidelines as Congress has considered an omnibus
1
bankruptcy bill. Proponents of the bill have been dismissive of

1. See Richard L. Stehl, The Failings of the Credit Counseling and Debtor Education
Requirements of the Proposed Consumer Bankruptcy Reform Legislation of 1998, 7 AM. BANKR.
INST. L. REV. 133, 143–44 (1999); Charles Jordan Tabb, A Century of Regress or Progress? A
Political History of Bankruptcy Legislation in 1898 and 1998, 15 BANKR. DEV. J. 343, 348–50
(1999); Elizabeth Warren, The Changing Politics of American Bankruptcy Reform, 37
OSGOODE HALL L.J. 189, 201 (1999) (“By politicizing the debates, the special interest groups
took some of the most important professionals out of the debates.”). For example, groups such
as the National Bankruptcy Conference and the Commercial Law League produced detailed
section-by-section analyses of the legislation and marked up each version of the legislation with
technical corrections, often at the request of Congressional staffers. See Tabb, supra, at 349
(noting the numerous pleas by the National Bankruptcy Conference and other bankruptcy
groups). Bankruptcy judges, lawyers, trustees, and academics testified at hearings and offered
additional assistance to lawmakers and staffers. See, e.g., The Consumer Bankruptcy Reform
Act: Seeking Fair and Practical Solutions to the Consumer Bankruptcy Crisis: Hearing on S.
1301 Before S. Judiciary Subcomm. on Admin. Oversight and the Courts, 105th Cong. (Mar.
11, 1998) [hereinafter Hearing on S. 1301], 1998 WL 8993073 (witness list); Hearing on S.
1301, supra, 1998 WL 8993336 (opening statement of Chuck Grassley, Chairman, S. Judiciary
Subcomm. on Admin. Oversight and the Courts). Yet Congress did not seriously engage with
these parties. See, e.g., Elizabeth Warren, The Market for Data: The Changing Role of Social
Sciences in Shaping the Law, 2002 WIS. L. REV. 1, 32–33 (discussing repeated and unreturned
calls that Professor Warren made to Rep. Gekas’s staff to discuss statistics featured in Gekas’s
press release). See generally DAVID A. SKEEL, JR., DEBT’S DOMINION: A HISTORY OF
BANKRUPTCY LAW IN AMERICA (2001) (discussing interest group history of bankruptcy); Susan
Block-Lieb, Congress’ Temptation to Defect: A Political and Economic Theory of Legislative
Resolutions to Financial Common Pool Problems, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 801 (1997) (contrasting
disorganized representation of debtor’s interests with organized and narrowly focused groups
within the credit industry); cf. generally Bruce G. Carruthers & Terence C. Halliday,
Professionals in Systemic Reform of Bankruptcy Law: The 1978 U.S. Bankruptcy Code and the
English Insolvency Act 1986, 74 AM. BANKR. L.J. 35 (2000) (discussing the role of bankruptcy
experts in the 1978 Bankruptcy Code revision).
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bankruptcy “establishment”2 concerns and input.3 The
bankruptcy establishment generally has thought that the bill is
misguided and poorly drafted, but lawmakers have
4
overwhelmingly supported it, largely on a bipartisan basis. Year
after year, Congress after Congress, lawmakers have lined up in
favor of the bill in large numbers. Yet proponents have had
surprising difficulty actually getting this bill enacted.
Although the determinants of legislative development are
complex and controversial, this Article focuses on the role of the
news media. Notwithstanding Congress’s general dismissal of the
5
bankruptcy establishment’s criticisms and concerns, the “fourth
6
branch” may have helped the excluded opposition by reframing
the debates in ways that had the potential to produce controversy
7
and delay. Once a story of debtor irresponsibility and a
2. Proponents of the bankruptcy bill sometimes used this term to refer to most
bankruptcy lawyers (including those who represent various types of creditors), trustees, judges,
and academics who expressed opposition to the legislation.
3. See, e.g., Rep. Bill McCollum, Bankruptcy Reform: A Return to Responsibility, HILL
(May 20, 1998) (describing a “campaign of false information being disseminated by bankruptcy
attorneys, bankruptcy ‘experts’ and other people maligning the legislation to further their
agendas,” but finding that “after subjecting the multitude of half-truths and false statements
disseminated by the critics . . . to the light of day, they just don’t stand up”); Tom Hamburger,
Auto Firms See Profit in Bankruptcy-Reform Bill Provision, WALL ST. J., Mar. 13, 2001, at A28
[hereinafter Hamburger, Auto Firms See Profit in Bankruptcy-Reform] (“The bankruptcy
establishment likes the system the way they have been running it.” (quoting an industry
analyst)); Jacob M. Schlesinger, Card Games: As Bankruptcies Surge, Creditors Lobby Hard to
Get Tougher Laws, WALL ST. J., June 17, 1998, at A1 [hereinafter Schlesinger, As Bankruptcies
Surge] (stating that the bankruptcy establishment simply prefers the status quo); refer also to
note 5 infra.
4. See, e.g., Congress Returns to an Active Legislative Agenda, WASH. WKLY., Feb. 26,
1999, http://www.bondmarkets.com/w-weekly/1999/wk022699.shtml (stating that Gekas’s bill
has wide bipartisan support in the House); Kathleen Day, House Passes Bankruptcy Limits:
Measure Would Make It Harder for Consumers to Wipe Out All Debts, WASH. POST, Mar. 2,
2001, at A1 [hereinafter Day, House Passes Bankruptcy Limits] (“There’s broad, bipartisan
support for updating the nation’s bankruptcy system and making it more balanced.” (quoting
Sen. Grassley)); Rep. George W. Gekas, Protecting Poor Debtors, N.Y. TIMES, May 17, 1999, at
A20 (observing the large amount of Democratic House support for the bill); Michael Schroeder
& Jacob M. Schlesinger, Financial-Services Bills Appear Dead, For Now, WALL ST. J., Oct. 12,
1998, at A4 (quoting American Bankers Association lobbyist as stating that given “clear
bipartisan majorities for both bills, we believe we can start early next year and have them
enacted fairly quickly”); Katharine Q. Seelye, First Lady in a Messy Fight on the Eve of Her
Campaign, N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 1999, § 1, at 1 [hereinafter Seelye, First Lady in a Messy
Fight] (quoting a MasterCard representative as stating that “it’s fair to say there is strong
bipartisan support for bankruptcy reform”).
5. Tabb, supra note 1, at 348–50 (chronicling Rep. Gekas’s statement that “he and
others in Congress would do what they pleased about bankruptcy, and did not really care what
the bankruptcy community thought about the matter”).
6. See DOUGLASS CATER, THE FOURTH BRANCH OF GOVERNMENT 13 (1959) (referring to
the news media).
7. Cf. Gary Blasi, Advocacy and Attribution: Shaping and Responding to Perceptions of
the Causes of Homelessness, 19 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 207, 209 (2000) (discussing the
timing and approach of homeless advocates’ public relations strategy); Dorothy A. Brown, The
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permissive system,8 bankruptcy became framed by issues of
credit industry power, predation, and influence, loopholes for the
rich, and, perhaps most effectively, concerns for women and
9
children.
This Article describes the path of this omnibus bankruptcy
legislation, offers an interdisciplinary analysis of the role of news
media in policymaking, and discusses these three emerging
frames. It then presents a structure for evaluating the impact of
the frames: controversy, bill improvement, and public
Invisibility Factor: The Limits of Public Choice Theory and Public Institutions, 74 WASH. U.
L.Q. 179, 215 (1996) (showing how media can influence legislative processes in ways that
public choice theory does not predict or explain); Vincent Schiraldi & Dan Macallair, Framing
the Framers: Changing the Debate over Juvenile Crime in San Francisco, in DO THE MEDIA
GOVERN? POLITICIANS, VOTERS, AND REPORTERS IN AMERICA 409, 411–12 (Shanto Iyengar &
Richard Reeves eds., 1997) [hereinafter DO THE MEDIA GOVERN?] (observing advocates’
attempt to use the media to frame juvenile justice); Daniel Shaviro, Beyond Public Choice and
Public Interest: A Study of the Legislative Process as Illustrated by Tax Legislation in the 1980s,
139 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 98 (1990) (stating that the media is a potentially powerful ally of, and has
a symbiotic relationship with, policy entrepreneurs); see also KATHLEEN HALL JAMIESON &
PAUL WALDMAN, THE PRESS EFFECT: POLITICIANS, JOURNALISTS, AND THE STORIES THAT SHAPE
THE WORLD 185 (2003) (analyzing strategic narratives used in political campaigns); Joshua A.
Newberg, The Narrative Construction of Antitrust, 12 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 181, 185–92
(2003) (analyzing competing narratives in Microsoft antitrust case); Joshua Wolf Shenk, Get
Me Rewrite! Stories Make the World Go Around. So How Come Liberals Can’t Tell One?,
Mother Jones, at http://www.motherjones.com/commentary/columns/2004/05/05_200.html
(May 14, 2004) (noting the lack of compelling narrative in the John Kerry campaign).
8. For lawmakers’ views along these lines, see, e.g., Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1998:
Hearing on H.R. 3150 Before the Subcomm. on Commercial and Administrative Law of the
House Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 8 (1998) (statement of Rep. McCollum).
[P]eople see bankruptcy as a financial planning tool, spurred on by
advertisements . . . . [T]he social stigma associated with filing for bankruptcy has
eroded. Bankruptcy was never meant to be used as a financial planning tool or for
mere convenience. These “bankruptcies of convenience” are a clear misuse of the
bankruptcy system, as bankruptcy becomes a first stop rather than a last resort.
Id.; Hearing on Bankruptcy Reform and Financial Services Issues Before the Senate Comm. on
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 106th Cong. (1999) (prepared testimony of Rep.
Boucher) (“Bankruptcies of convenience are driving this increase.”), http://banking.senate.gov/
99_03hrg/032599/boucher.htm; 145 CONG. REC. H2646 (daily ed. May 5, 1999) (statement of
Rep. Pryce) (“[W]hen intelligent citizens ignore basic common sense by spending outside of
their means, we need to establish a reasonable level of accountability and demand some
personal responsibility to protect those who have extended credit to them in good faith.”);
Robin Jeweler, Congressional Res. Serv., Issues in Consumer Bankruptcy Reform Before the
107th Congress 2–3 (Feb. 9, 2001).
The high volume of consumer bankruptcy filings during the 1990’s fuels the
argument that the current law is too lenient, i.e., “debtor-friendly.” . . . The legislation
is intended, among other things, to make filing more difficult and thereby thwart
“bankruptcies of convenience”; to revive the social “stigma” of a bankruptcy filing; to
prevent bankruptcy from being utilized as a financial planning tool; to determine
who can pay their indebtedness and to ensure that they do.
Id. For news coverage to this effect, refer to notes 20–23 infra and accompanying text.
9. Refer to Part IV infra; see also JAMIESON & WALDMAN, supra note 7, at 122 (stating
that the framing of issues is “the product of a give-and-take between political actors and
reporters”).
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educational value.10 In a brief analysis of each of these issues, I
posit that two frames increased the bill’s controversy, two were
likely related to changes made to the bill (although it is disputed
whether those changes constitute improvements), and the frame
of women and children had the greatest educational value,
notwithstanding
assertions
by
some
lawmakers
and
11
commentators that this frame was contrived.
Demonstrating a precise causal relationship between the
media and the legislative process goes well beyond the far more
modest aims of this Article and would have required a different
type of analysis and methodology. Nonetheless, this initial
exploration suggests that had the news media continued to frame
bankruptcy principally in terms of debtor irresponsibility and
system permissiveness, the legislative process may have unfolded
differently. The implications far transcend the subject of
bankruptcy.
II. LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENT AND THE PROMINENT
BANKRUPTCY STORY
In the mid-1990s, Congress had no obvious interest in
making major bankruptcy changes. It passed a set of modest
12
amendments in 1994. It also established a National Bankruptcy
Review Commission to study the bankruptcy system for a two-

10. For discussions of media being the principal source of the public’s knowledge about
law, see, e.g., Linda Greenhouse, Telling the Court’s Story: Justice and Journalism at the
Supreme Court, 105 YALE L.J. 1537, 1538 (1996) (noting that the public’s only knowledge of the
workings of the Supreme Court derives from occasional references in the media); Cass R.
Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021, 2050 (1996) (noting that
the public learns about court cases through the news media, if at all); Catherine E. Vance &
Paige Barr, The Facts & Fiction of Bankruptcy Reform, 1 DEPAUL BUS. & COMM. L.J. 361, 364
n.12 (2003) (“[E]ven extensive coverage [of bankruptcy reform] in the print media does not
mean that most Americans fully understand bankruptcy reform and its heavy industry
support.”); Daniel M. Filler, From Law to Content in the New Media Marketplace, 90 CAL. L.
REV. 1739, 1754–55 (2002) (reviewing FEDWA MALTI-DOUGLAS, STARR REPORT DISROBED
(2000)) (observing that the news serves as the principal intermediary for the public to discover
law). But see JIM WILLIS, THE SHADOW WORLD: LIFE BETWEEN THE NEWS MEDIA AND REALITY
140–43 (1991) (arguing that the anti-big-business values of reporting interfere with business
reporters’ ability to educate the public); John J. Oslund, The Media and Government
Regulation: Guarding the Hen House, 11 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 559, 561 (2002) (arguing that
the media is a less effective educator on “narrower issues that are more complex and/or
abstract”). For a focus on how fictional accounts contribute to the public’s understanding of law,
see, e.g., PRIME TIME LAW: FICTIONAL TELEVISION AS LEGAL NARRATIVE VII (Robert M. Jarvis
& Paul R. Joseph eds., 1998) (surveying television’s ability to influence people’s understandings
of the legal world); Martha Merrill Umphrey, Media Melodrama! Sensationalism and the 1907
Trial of Harry Thaw, 43 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 715, 718 (1999) (noting that criminal trial
reporting contributes to a popular understanding of criminal responsibility).
11. Refer to Part IV.C infra.
12. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, 108 Stat. 4107.
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year period.13 Congress told the Bankruptcy Commission that it
14
did not have a mandate to propose significant changes.
Commission members were chosen by the President, Chief
Justice Rehnquist, and minority and majority leaders in the
15
House and Senate. Both the bankruptcy establishment and the
16
They
financial services industry were actively involved.
participated in well-attended meetings and hearings around the
17
and wrote thousands of letters and e-mail
country
18
submissions.
During this process, however, the annual bankruptcy filing
19
rate surpassed one million. This large number of bankruptcy
13. §§ 602, 608, 108 Stat. at 4147, 4149. The Bankruptcy Commission was charged with
investigating and studying issues and problems relating to Title 11, evaluating the advisability
of proposals and current arrangements, preparing a report, and soliciting divergent views.
§ 603.
14. H.R. REP. NO. 103-835, at 59 (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3340, 3368.
[T]he Commission should be aware that Congress is generally satisfied with the basic
framework established in the current Bankruptcy Code. Therefore, the work of the
Commission should be based upon reviewing, improving, and updating the Code in
ways which do not disturb the fundamental tenets and balance of current law.
Id. Sen. Grassley, who later would figure prominently in bankruptcy reform, echoed this
sentiment in floor statements:
I want to stress that this Commission is designed to review the code, and we are not
setting it up to overhaul it. The term “fine tuning” might better fit the purpose . . . ,
because we on the Judiciary Committee are generally satisfied with the code, and we
are not interested in the proposals that start from scratch.
140 CONG. REC. S4508 (1994) (statement of Sen. Grassley).
15. The Commission members themselves generally cannot be described as quintessential
bankruptcy establishment. In terms of membership, President Clinton chose labor lawyer
Babette Ceccotti and CPA and turnaround expert Jay Alix as members, and former Congressman
Mike Synar as the chair, who was succeeded by lawyer Brady Williamson after Synar passed
away. Nat’l Bankr. Review Comm’n, Bankruptcy: The Next Twenty Years 15 (Oct. 20, 1997)
[hereinafter Bankruptcy: The Next Twenty Years], http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/nbrc/report/
01title.html. Chief Justice Rehnquist chose Hon. Edith Jones of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit and Hon. Robert Ginsberg of the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of
Illinois. Id. at 54, 56. Rep. Robert Michel (R-Ill.) appointed former Congressman M. Caldwell
Butler, Rep. Thomas Foley (D-Wash.) appointed real estate lawyer John Gose, Senators Robert
Byrd (D-W. Va.) and George Mitchell (D-Me.) appointed lawyer Jeffery Hartley, and Sen. Bob
Dole (R-Kan.) appointed tax consultant James Shepard. Id. at 56–57. The reporter was Professor
Elizabeth Warren, and the two principal consultants were Professor Lawrence P. King and
lawyer Stephen H. Case. Id. at 57.
16. See, e.g., Hon. William T. Bodoh & Lawrence P. Dempsey, Bankruptcy Reform: An
Orderly Development of Public Policy?, 49 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 191, 194 (2001) (describing open
process of Bankruptcy Commission).
17. Bankruptcy: The Next Twenty Years, supra note 15, at 65 (noting that the Commission
held twenty-one hearings and meetings at sites throughout the nation, which were attended by
more than 2600 people).
18. Id. at 68 (noting that the Commission received over 2300 submissions from the
bankruptcy community and the general public).
19. See Bankruptcy Filing Statistics, Administrative Office of the United States Courts (on
file with the Houston Law Review) (including business & nonbusiness bankruptcy cases for the
period ending September 30, 1996).
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filings within a single year provoked questions about the
neediness of bankruptcy filers and the permissiveness of the
system.20 For example, newspapers quoted Federal Reserve
Board Chair Alan Greenspan as lamenting that “personal
bankruptcies are soaring because Americans have lost their
sense of shame in filing for bankruptcy court protection” and
21
noting that “a disappearance of ‘the stigma of bankruptcy.’” The
USA Today editorial desk blamed consumer attitudes, a decline
22
in stigma, and bankruptcy laws that were too easy. A later
editorial asked, “Could there really be so much quiet desperation
amid so much plenty? Or—as seems more likely—is bankruptcy
23
protection just too easy to get these days?” Examples of similar
quotes could fill a law review article by themselves, and it was
within this environment that the Bankruptcy Commission
completed its work.

20. See, e.g., Mary Deibel, Bankruptcies Booming in ‘97 Despite Economic Prosperity,
ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, June 11, 1997, at 10B (recognizing that “people who are feeling good
about the economy and get in over their heads also are contributing to the increase”); Saul
Hansell, Personal Bankruptcies Surging as Economy Hums, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 25, 1996, § 1, at 1
(stating that one reason for the increase in bankruptcy filings is that the stigma attached to filing
bankruptcy is no longer present); Editorial, “Last Resort Is Coming First”: Something’s Wrong: In
These Good Times, Bankruptcy Is Booming, L.A. TIMES, July 28, 1997, at B4 (“Something is
haywire in the way Americans deal with personal debt. How else to explain the record
bankruptcy filings in California and other states with strong job growth, decreasing
unemployment and much improved economies?”). Notably, the L.A. Times editorial page later
became critical of the bankruptcy legislation. See Editorial, Bankruptcy Non-Reform: Proposed
Changes Would Weaken Protections for Truly Needy Debtors and Leave Unchanged Gaping
Loopholes that Wealthy Filers Use to Put Up Shield of Bankruptcy, L.A. TIMES, June 8, 1998, at
B4 (observing that the credit industry claims that consumers are avoiding debt through
bankruptcy laws).
21. Bloomberg News, Filings Worry Greenspan, TIMES-PICAYUNE, Mar. 20, 1997, at C6; see
also James Carter, Bankruptcy as the Last Resort, WASH. TIMES, Dec. 18, 1996, at A15 (“In
practice, however, [a] fresh start sometimes becomes a free ride.”); L. Stuart Ditzen, Credit Cards
Paving a Path to Bankruptcy, PHILA. INQUIRER, Aug. 25, 1996, at A1 (describing credit-card use
as an addiction and a nasty vice, and describing bankruptcy as a “quick way out of excess creditcard debt”); Hansell, supra note 20 (“‘I’m just taking advantage of one of the opportunities the
Government offers. It doesn’t have the stigma it had.’” (quoting an individual debtor)).
22. Editorial, Too-Easy Bankruptcy Laws Give Abusers a Free Ride, USA TODAY, Oct. 4,
1996, at 12A (explaining that overuse of the bankruptcy system costs each American family about
$100 per year in higher interest costs and prices). However, USA Today also published an
“opposing view” editorial. See Gary Klein, Editorial, Blame the Credit Pushers, USA TODAY, Oct.
4, 1996, at 12A (“Responsibility for the increase in filings should be placed where it belongs—on a
system that pushes people to use more credit than they can afford. The pusher in this system is
the consumer-credit industry.”).
23. Editorial, Debtor’s Delight, INVESTOR’S BUS. DAILY, Jan. 15, 1998, at A30.
Once upon a time, bankruptcy was a shameful state, one indulged in only by
“deadbeats’ and losers.” Unfortunately, just as sharing living quarters with a member of
the opposite sex, bearing children out of wedlock and suing people for no good reason
have become routine, bankruptcy shows signs of becoming positively fashionable.
Morally Bankrupt, N.Y. POST, Dec. 21, 1997, at 60.
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The Bankruptcy Commission’s final report, dated October
20, 1997, bulged with over 170 recommendations for changes to
24
all types of bankruptcy cases. Although the majority of the
Commission expressed concern about the filing rate, it did not
attribute the filing increase to the reasons that the press and
25
cited sources often identified. Even before the Commission
issued its final report, however, the credit industry expressed
public distaste for its proposals and its failure to propose new
26
restrictions on bankruptcy eligibility. Consequently, the industry
27
turned to friends in Congress.
A. 105th Congress (1997–1998)
Rep. Bill McCollum (R-Fla.) did not wait for the Bankruptcy
Commission to submit its report before introducing consumer
bankruptcy legislation, The Responsible Borrower Protection
28
Bankruptcy Act, House Bill 2500, on September 18, 1997.

24. See generally Bankruptcy: The Next Twenty Years, supra note 15 (providing chapters of
recommendations on topics ranging from family payment plans to partnership
recommendations).
25. Id. at 82–95 (citing, among other things, an increase in available consumer credit as
contributing to the rise in bankruptcy filings).
26. See, e.g., Paul Gentile, No Happy Campers Here: National Bankruptcy Review
Commission Issues Final Report, CREDIT UNION TIMES, Oct. 29, 1997, at 1 (“‘What I think they
should do with the report is forget they ever wrote it.’” (reporting a credit union president’s
statement)); Donald G. Ogilvie, Executive Vice President, Am. Bankers’ Ass’n, Letters to the
Editor: Placing the Blame for Bankruptcy Reform, WALL ST. J., Aug. 26, 1997, at A17
(“[R]ecommendations make it easy for people of means to walk away from their debts while
raising the cost of goods and services for every U.S. consumer—not the solution we need given
record consumer bankruptcy filings.”); see also Steve Cocheo, In Debt and Loving It: With Record
Numbers Filing for Bankruptcy, Something Besides These Debtors Is “Broke.” Question Is, Will
Upcoming Recommendations of a Federal Commission Fix Anything?, A.B.A. BANKING J., Aug.
1997, at 30 (noting that the Commission has received criticism from both debtor and creditor
interests), http://www.banking.com/aba/cover_0897.htm; Jaret Seiberg, Deeply Split Bankruptcy
Commission May Lack Clout with Lawmakers, AM. BANKER, June 20, 1997, at 1 (quoting a credit
industry lobbyist describing a Commission proposal as “‘one nail in the credibility of the
commission’”). Some Commission proposals, however, did coincide with credit industry proposals.
Compare Bankruptcy: The Next Twenty Years, supra note 15, with Transcript, Presentation of
National Consumer Bankruptcy Coalition to the National Bankruptcy Review Commission (Dec.
17, 1996) (including recommendations for multiple filing restrictions, random audits, and better
data collection).
27. See SKEEL, JR., supra note 1, at 187–88 (noting that “creditors were less than
enthusiastic” about the Bankruptcy Commission process and promoted legislation to “preempt”
the Bankruptcy Commission recommendations); Robert J. Landry, III, The Policy and Forces
Behind Consumer Bankruptcy Reform: A Classic Battle Over Problem Definition, 33 U. MEM. L.
REV. 509, 517–18 (2003) (suggesting that when credit industry lobbyists failed to induce the
Commission to produce a report aligned with their interests, the creditors turned to Congress and
tried to shape public opinion in aid of their cause).
28. H.R. 2500, 105th Cong. (1997); Gentile, supra note 26 (“‘I could see the
Commission wasn’t going to put in a needs based provision in their recommendations, so
we went ahead and drafted a bill.’” (quoting Rep. McCollum)). See generally Robin
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Although Rep. McCollum was not a member of the relevant
Judiciary Committee subcommittee,29 his bill sought to alter
consumer bankruptcy in accordance with industry proposals and
30
the prominent media portrayals of the bankruptcy crisis.
In the winter of 1998, the chair of the relevant Judiciary
Committee subcommittee (Rep. George Gekas (R-Pa.)) introduced
31
another bankruptcy bill, House Bill 3150. This bill contained
consumer bankruptcy provisions that essentially replicated
House Bill 2500, but it also included extensive business
32
bankruptcy and bankruptcy tax amendments. Rep. McCollum
33
also supported this bill, and the bill began its multi-year
bipartisan odyssey through Congress.
Rep. Gekas’s subcommittee held a series of hearings that
included many credit industry representatives and some
34
members of the bankruptcy establishment as witnesses. The
bankruptcy establishment expressed concern about policy issues,
drafting problems, and the lack of evidence to support significant
35
changes in any event. The bankruptcy establishment was also
concerned that the bill would proceed with undue haste,
departing from the tradition of deliberation that had
36
accompanied large legislative changes in the past. These
legislative hearings were pro forma, however, and seemed to
have little effect on the bill’s development.
Like the House, the Senate essentially preempted the
Bankruptcy Commission’s efforts with its own bill. One day after
the Commission submitted its report, two senators—Senators

Jeweler, Survey of the Impact of Advisory Study Commissions, Congressional Res. Serv.,
The Library of Congress CRS-9 (Sept. 3, 1997) (noting that “in some instances, advisory
commissions are hampered when they deal with subjects that are controversial, political,
and subject to strong emotional convictions,” and including among factors that affect
Commission efficacy “lack of consensus about the nature of impact of the problem” or
“controversy over solutions”).
29. See Bill McCollum, Biography, at http://www.leadingauthorities.com/14371/Bill_
McCollum.htm (2004).
30. See generally Victoria F. Nourse & Jane S. Schacter, The Politics of Legislative
Drafting: A Congressional Case Study, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 575, 587 (2002) (reporting that
Senate staffers identified bankruptcy as having particularly extensive industry lobbyist
involvement, especially on the House side).
31. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1998, H.R. 3150, 105th Cong (1998).
32. §§ 302, 402–415, 802–818 (setting forth business requirements, such as
requiring credit counseling, and tax requirements, such as interest rates on tax claims
and information to be specified by the filer).
33. See H.R. 3150 (listing Rep. McCollum as a cosponsor).
34. H.R. 3150 Hearing Testimony (Mar. 12, 18, 1998) (on file with the Houston Law
Review).
35. Id.
36. Id.
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Charles Grassley (R-Iowa) and Richard Durbin (D-Ill.)—
introduced the Consumer Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1997,
Senate Bill 1301.37 Later in the 105th Congress, Sen. Grassley
38
would also introduce a business and tax bankruptcy bill, which
ultimately was folded into the large omnibus bill.
39
Sen. Grassley’s subcommittee held hearings, although Sen.
Grassley viewed those who voiced opposition to his bill as a
40
“fringe element.” But the bill did evolve, particularly as Senate
41
Democrats became more actively involved in the discussions.
The Clinton Administration supported most of both the
42
House and Senate bankruptcy bills. After all, the bill’s
proponents framed the bill as an issue of personal
responsibility, which was a theme of the welfare reform that
43
President Clinton had supported. Yet the Administration’s

37. S. 1301, 105th Cong. (1997). This bill differed from the House Bill in its
approach to screening Chapter 7 debtors and in its amendments directed toward abusive
creditor practices. Compare S. 1301, with H.R. 3150. Perhaps for these reasons, the
Grassley-Durbin bill later would be characterized as the “liberal” or “moderate” bill that
was “more friendly to borrowers.” See, e.g., Dan Morgan, Creditors’ Money Talks Louder in
Bankruptcy Debates: Consumer Groups Fight New Curbs on Insolvent Debtors, WASH.
POST, June 1, 1999, at A4 [hereinafter Morgan, Creditors’ Money].
38. Business Bankruptcy Reform Act, S. 1914, 105th Cong. (1998).
39. See, e.g., Hearing on S. 1301, supra note 1, 1998 WL 8993073 (witness list);
Hearing on S. 1301, supra note 1, 1998 WL 8993336 (opening statement of Chuck
Grassley, Chairman, S. Judiciary Subcomm. on Admin. Oversight and the Courts).
40. 144 CONG. REC. S9093 (1998) (statement of Sen. Grassley).
41. As one example, Senate Democrats were interested in promoting responsible
lending practices outside of the bankruptcy context. See, e.g., S. Amends. 3540–3617,
105th Cong., 144 CONG. REC. S9942–10,728, S10,843–44 (1998) (showing amendments to
Senate Bill 1301, including extensions of credit to underage consumers and enhanced
disclosures); Richard Durbin, Editorial, Credit Blues: Banks, Consumers Both
Responsible, PANTAGRAPH, Dec. 26, 1997, at A11. For example, the bill as passed amended
the Truth in Lending Act to require that credit-card statements include an estimate of the
borrower’s total cost of making only the recommended minimum monthly payment.
Consumer Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1998, H.R. 3150, 105th Cong. § 209(a) (1998).
42. Executive Office of the President, Office of Mgmt. & Budget, Statement of
Administration Policy on H.R. 3150—Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1998 (June 10, 1998)
[hereinafter Statement of Administration Policy on H.R. 3150] (noting that although the
Clinton Administration supported debtor responsibility for those with the means to pay, it
did not support House Bill 3150 in its then present form), http://www.
whitehouse.gov/omb/legislative/sap/105-2/HR3150-h.html; Digest, WASH. POST, May 9,
1998, at C1 (showing that the Clinton Administration opposed the House Bill because it
lacked sufficient debtor protections). The Department of Justice previously had submitted
twenty-four pages of detailed commentary. See Letter from Ann M. Harkins, Acting
Assistant Attorney General, U.S. Department of Justice, to Hon. Henry J. Hyde,
Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary (May 7, 1998) [hereinafter Letter from Ann M.
Harkins] (on file with the Houston Law Review).
43. See generally A. Mechele Dickerson, America’s Uneasy Relationship with the
Working Poor, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 17, 51 & n.144 (1999) (describing the categories of
debtors and identifying irresponsible spending as the primary cause of debt in two of the
three categories). For similar reasons, moderate and conservative Democrats generally
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support was not iron-clad: it developed concerns about discrete
aspects of the bill and preferred the Senate Bill to the House
Bill.44
In the House, many Democrats supported the bill
notwithstanding Administration concerns, and the bill easily
45
passed by a 306–118 vote on June 10, 1998. The Senate
overwhelmingly approved its own bill 97–1 on September 23,
1998, with only the late Sen. Paul Wellstone (D-Minn.) voting
46
against it. In the reconciliation process, however, lawmakers
excluded most Democrats from the negotiations, omitted or
watered down most of the provisions that Senate Democrats had
incorporated into the bill, and added provisions that many
47
Senate Democrats would find objectionable.
supported the bankruptcy bill. See, e.g., New Democrats Online, Message of the Week,
New Democrats Support Bankruptcy Reform (Feb. 26, 2001) (expressing view that
bankruptcy has become a first option for debtors due to the lack of stigma associated with
bankruptcy), http://www.ndol.org/print.cfm?contentid=3099. “Personal responsibility” is a
key value for New Democrats. Id.
44. See Statement of Administration Policy on H.R. 3150, supra note 42 (criticizing,
among other things, House Bill 3150’s “rigid and arbitrary means test” for determining
debtor ability to pay); Digest, supra note 42. The Department of Justice previously had
submitted twenty-four pages of detailed commentary. See Letter from Ann M. Harkins,
supra note 42, at 1 (advocating rejection of House Bill’s means test).
45. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1998, H.R. 3150, House Roll Call Vote #225, 105th
Cong. (June 10, 1998), http://clerk.house.gov/evs/1998/roll225.xml. As discussed later, a
challenge to garnering maximum support was a provision that capped the amount of
homestead exemption that a state could provide, which was problematic for
representatives from states such as Texas and Florida. This exemption historically has
been controversial. See, e.g., Eric Posner, The Political Economy of the Bankruptcy Reform
Act of 1978, 96 MICH. L. REV. 47, 94–108 (1997) (reviewing homestead exemption’s origin
as a mechanism for sparsely populated states such as Texas to encourage migration from
other states). Rep. Gekas successfully sponsored a floor House amendment to eliminate
the cap. H. Amend. 666, H.R. 3150, House Roll Call Vote #222, 105th Cong. (June 10,
1998) (passing Gekas’s amendment, 222–204), http://clerk.house.gov/evs/1998/roll222.xml.
46. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1998, H.R. 3150, Senate Roll Call Vote #284, 105th
Cong. (Sept. 23, 1998) (passing House Bill 3150 with text of Senate Bill 1301 as amended
by vote of 97–1, with Sen. Wellstone as the lone dissenter), http://www.senate.gov/
legislative/LIS/roll_call_lists/roll_call_vote_cfm.cfm?congress=105&session=2&vote=0028
4; Who Cast That Lone Vote Against S. 1301?, 8 CONSUMER BANKR. NEWS, Oct. 22, 1998,
at 4, 4 (“‘Unfortunately, thanks to a well-orchestrated, well-funded lobbying campaign by
the credit card industry, the voices of these people were drowned out today. It’s another
case in Washington of well-organized, high-paid lobbyists carrying the day at the expense
of ordinary citizens and consumers.’” (quoting Sen. Wellstone)).
47. For example, the lawmakers included provisions banning class actions against
lenders who violate certain provisions of bankruptcy law. See H.R. REP. NO. 105-794
§§ 116–117, at 19–20 (1998); Caroline E. Mayer, Negotiators Complete Bankruptcy Reform
Bill, WASH. POST, Oct. 8, 1998, at E1 [hereinafter Mayer, Negotiators Complete
Bankruptcy Reform Bill] (quoting the comments of angered Sen. Durbin, who was
excluded from bill reconciliation); Schroeder & Schlesinger, supra note 4 (noting Durbin’s
threats to filibuster the bill based on his belief that the bill was too procreditor);
Katharine Q. Seelye, Republicans Agree to New Limits on Consumer Bankruptcy Filings,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 1998, at A1 [hereinafter Seelye, Republicans Agree to New Limits]
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The House easily passed this conference report bill by a vote
of 300–125, with plenty of Democrat support, on October 9,
48
1998. Due to a filibuster threat preventing further action, the
49
Senate voted only to consider the conference report.
Notwithstanding overwhelming support, the 105th Congress
adjourned with no enactment of a bankruptcy bill.
B. 106th Congress (1999–2000)
Early in the 106th Congress, Sen. Grassley and Rep. Gekas
reintroduced the failed conference report with some additional
50
provisions, now hundreds of pages, in both the Senate and
51
House. Again, the House easily approved the bill on May 5,
52
1999 by a vote of 313–108.
Given the events at the end of the 105th Congress, one
might have expected Senate Democrats to oppose the bill or be
(quoting Sen. Durbin as saying that the Senate Bill “‘has been devastated in a closed-door
Republican conference’”); see also Letter from Jacob J. Lew, Director, Office of
Management and Budget, Executive Office of the President, to Hon. Trent Lott (Oct. 9,
1998) (on file with the Houston Law Review) (making veto threat).
48. H.R. REP. NO. 105-794, House Roll Call Vote #506, 105th Cong. (Oct. 9, 1998),
http://clerk.house.gov/evs/1998/roll506.xml.
49. Motion to Proceed to Consider Conference Report on H.R. 3150, Senate Roll Call
Vote #313, 105th Cong. (Oct. 9, 1998) (94–2), http://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_
call_lists/roll_call_vote_cfm.cfm?congress=105&session=2&vote=00313; Bankruptcy Bill
Dies a Slow Death as Term Ends, CREDIT CARD NEWS, Oct. 15, 1998, at 1, available at
1998 WL 14086506.
50. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1999, H.R. 833, 106th Cong. §§ 101–1130 (1999).
51. Congress Returns to an Active Legislative Agenda, supra note 4; “Dear
Colleague” Letter from Reps. Gekas, Boucher, McCollum, and Moran (Feb. 25, 1999) (on
file with the Houston Law Review) (explaining that this was same bill 300 members had
voted for in the last congressional session and seeking bipartisan support); see also Letter
from Dennis K. Burke, Acting Assistant Attorney General, U.S. Department of Justice, to
Hon. George W. Gekas, Chairman, Subcommittee on Commercial and Administrative Law
(Mar. 24, 1999) (on file with the Houston Law Review) (detailing thirty-five pages of
Department of Justice commentary on the proposed bill); Letter from Jacob Lew, Director
of the Executive Office of the President, Office of Management and Budget, to Hon. John
Conyers, Member, Committee on the Judiciary (Mar. 23, 1999) (on file with the Houston
Law Review) (“Our position from last year [on the Conference Report] has not changed.”);
Executive Office of the President, Office of Mgmt. & Budget, Statement of Administration
Policy on H.R. 833—Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1999 (May 5, 1999) (reporting the Clinton
Administration’s strong opposition to H.R. 833), http://www.whitehouse.gov/
omb/legislative/sap/106-1/HR833-h.html.
52. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1999, H.R. 833, House Roll Call Vote #115, 106th
Cong. (May 5, 1999), http://clerk.house.gov/evs/1999/roll115.xml. As in the 105th
Congress, Rep. Gekas successfully sought to diffuse objections to a homestead exemption
cap by permitting the states to opt out of the cap. H. Amend. 54 to H.R. 833, 106th Cong.
(1999) (agreed to by voice vote). In addition, Judiciary Committee Chair Henry Hyde (RIll.) had tried to replace the means test with a more discretionary approach to screening
cases, but Congress overruled him. H. Amend. 83 to H.R. 833, 106th Cong. (1999) (failing
184–238); see also Rep. Henry J. Hyde, Editorial, Why Squeeze Every Last Penny from the
Bankrupt?, N.Y. TIMES, May 18, 1999, at A23 (justifying his amendment).
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skeptical of the prospect of a balanced product.53 Nonetheless, the
54
bill passed 83–14 on February 2, 2000, after the Senate had
55
engaged in another round of floor amendments.
56
The House and Senate Bills were similar but not identical,
and the reconciliation process again was not a model of
negotiation and compromise. Bill proponents excluded many
Democrats and inserted their preferred version of the legislation
57
into the shell of a moribund embassy security conference report.
Again, much of the Senate’s long amendment process was largely
for naught.
The House adopted the bankruptcy conference report on
58
October 12, 2000 by a voice vote. Notwithstanding the changes
made in conference, a veto-proof majority of the Senate (70–28)
59
voted favorably on the conference report on December 7, 2000.
President Clinton then “pocket-vetoed” the bill because of several
60
discrete points of contention. Like the 105th Congress, the
53. Refer to note 47 supra and accompanying text.
54. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 2000, H.R. 833, Senate Roll Call Vote #5, 106th Cong.
(Feb. 2, 2000), http://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call_lists/roll_call_vote_cfm.cfm?
congress=106&session=2&vote=00005.
55. S. Amends. 1695–2530, 106th Cong., 145 CONG. REC. S11143–71, S14102–11
(1999). Several Senate Democrats also unsuccessfully introduced an alternative bill,
which was based on the bill that had passed the Senate 97–1 the prior year. “Dear
Colleague” Letter from Sens. Durbin, Leahy, Kennedy, and Feingold (May 14, 1999) (on
file with the Houston Law Review)
56. See generally Am. Bankr. Inst., Summary of Key Areas of Disagreement
S. 625/H.R. 833 Conference (2000) (on file with the Houston Law Review); Letter from
Jacob J. Lew, Director, Office of Management and Budget, Executive Office of the
President, to Hon. Orrin G. Hatch (May 12, 2000) (on file with the Houston Law Review)
(comparing the House and Senate Bills).
57. See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 2000, H.R. 2415, 106th Cong. (2000) (“To enhance
security of United States missions and personnel overseas, to authorize appropriations for
the Department of State for fiscal year 2000, and for other purposes.”). This resolution
had passed by voice vote and unanimous consent earlier. Id. See generally Press Release,
Statement of U.S. Senator Paul Wellstone on the 11th Hour Attempt to Pass So-Called
Bankruptcy Reform Legislation, Common Dreams Progressive Newswire, at http://www.
commondreams.org/news2000/1012-04.htm (Oct. 12, 2000) (“House and Senate
Republicans have taken a secretly negotiated bankruptcy bill and stuffed it into the
hollowed-out husk of the State Department authorization bill . . . .”). Sen. Grassley and
Majority Leader Trent Lott also introduced another omnibus bankruptcy reform bill,
Senate Bill 3046, which did not go forward. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 2000, S. 3046,
106th Cong (2000).
58. H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 106-970, House Voice Vote, 106th Cong. (Oct. 12, 2000),
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d106:HR02415:@@@X; see also Press Release, Rep.
George W. Gekas, Bankruptcy Reform Bill Passes: Bill Moves to Senate; Passage
Expected (Oct. 12, 2000) (on file with the Houston Law Review).
59. H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 108-970, Senate Roll Call Vote #297, 106th Cong. (Dec. 7,
2000), http://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call_lists/roll_call_vote_cfm.cfm?congress
=106&session=2&vote=00297.
60. See, e.g., Associated Press, Legislation to Overhaul Laws on Bankruptcy Dies as
President Fails to Sign It, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 20, 2000, at A32 (“‘President Clinton let the
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106th Congress adjourned without enactment of a bankruptcy
bill, notwithstanding overwhelming support.
C. 107th Congress (2001–2002)
In 2001, the text of the pocket-vetoed conference report was
reintroduced61 and passed 306–108 in the House on March 1,
62
2001. The Senate’s approval (83–15) of a nearly identical bill
63
followed less than two weeks later. Yet Congress took no further
action until 2002, when Democrats controlled the Senate by a
64
tiny majority. Although the bill remained hundreds of pages
long and contained many provisions that had never been
seriously debated, public Congressional discussion of bankruptcy
focused on two narrow but salient issues. First, lawmakers
disputed how to deal appropriately with generous or unlimited
state homestead exemptions that applied in bankruptcy cases.
Lawmakers found a compromise on this issue in the spring of
65
2002.
Second, lawmakers disputed the need for a specific exception
to discharge for debts arising from violations of the Freedom of

American people down by pocket vetoing the bipartisan bankruptcy reform bill.’” (quoting
Sen. Grassley)); Stephen Labaton, Promised Veto Appears to Doom Congressional
Agreement on Overhauling Bankruptcy Law, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 2000, at A30
[hereinafter Labaton, Promised Veto] (“[O]bjections raised by the White House were not
central to the issues and are excuses.” (quoting lobbyist Ed Yingling)); Press Release,
Gekas Denounces Clinton Pocket Veto of Bankruptcy Reform; Gekas Encouraged by Bush
Administration (Dec. 21, 2000). For some of the stated reasons for the pocket veto, refer to
note 209 infra and accompanying text.
61. News Release, U.S. House of Reps., Comm. on the Judiciary, Committee Passes
Bankruptcy Reform Legislation, at http://www.house.gov/judiciary/news021501.htm (Feb.
15, 2001) (noting that “this legislation is virtually identical to the conference report on
H.R. 2415, the ‘Gekas-Grassley Bankruptcy Reform Act of 2000’ that was pocket vetoed
last December by then-President Clinton”).
62. Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act, H.R. 333, House
Roll Call Vote #25, 107th Cong. (Mar. 1, 2001), http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2001/roll025.
xml.
63. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 2001, S. 420, Senate Roll Call Vote #36, 107th Cong.
(Mar. 15, 2001), http://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call_lists/roll_call_vote_cfm.
cfm?congress=107&session=1&vote=00036.
64. The time delay is likely explained by other events, such as Sen. Jefford’s leaving
the Republican party, Balance of Power: “A Struggle for Our Leaders to Deal With Me and
for Me to Deal With Them”, N.Y. TIMES, May 25, 2001, at A20 (displaying transcript of
Sen. Jefford’s public announcement that he was leaving the Republican Party), the
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, see Todd S. Purdum & Robin Toner, A Day of
Terror: The Federal Government: Driven Underground, Administration and Congressional
Officials Stay on the Job, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12, 2001, at A5, and the discovery of anthrax
in the congressional buildings, Philip Shenon, A Nation Challenged: Discovery on
Anthrax; Suspicious Letter to a 2nd Senator, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 17, 2001, at A1.
65. See Philip Shenon, Congress Panel Agrees to Limit Home Shield in Bankruptcy,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 24, 2002, at C1.
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Access to Clinic Entrances (FACE) Act.66 Some Senate Democrats
conditioned their support for the bill on the addition of a new
exception to discharge, while other members of Congress strongly
67
opposed such an amendment. Lawmakers reached what they
thought was a suitable compromise on this issue in the summer
68
of 2002, and the consumer credit industry retained Kenneth
Starr, at that time an attorney with the law firm of Kirkland and
Ellis, to assure antiabortion lawmakers that the legislation
would have “little practical effect” on the rights of abortion
69
protesters.
Neither the Starr letter nor the language of the compromise
swayed enough members of the House to ensure passage. In the
post-midterm election lame-duck session, members of the House
of Representatives voted against bringing up the conference
70
with
antiabortion
representatives
report
(243–172),
71
substantially tipping the scales. Like the two prior Congresses,
the 107th Congress ended without enactment of the omnibus
bankruptcy bill.
D. 108th Congress (2003–2004)
By the beginning of the 108th Congress, plenty had changed
since lawmakers initially introduced a bankruptcy bill in 1997.
In addition to the obvious change in the economic climate and the
change in presidents, voters had sent home Reps. McCollum and
72
Gekas, who were two of the original House sponsors.

66. See generally Margaret Whiteman, Comment, F.A.C.E.-ing Up to Bankruptcy
Reform: Why a Separate Provision Denying Discharge of Debts Arising Out of Abortion
Clinic Violence Is Redundant, 108 PENN. ST. L. REV. 395, 395–96, 405–06 (2003).
67. Id.
68. See Linda Punch, Bankruptcy Reform: Try, Try Again, CREDIT CARD MGMT.,
Feb. 27, 2003, at 32, 32 (chronicling the myriad legislative attempts at bankruptcy
reform, including compromise on the FACE amendment), available at 2003 WL 11823279.
69. Letter from Kenneth Starr, to Hon. Steve Barlett, President, The Financial
Services Roundtable (Oct. 4, 2002) (on file with the Houston Law Review).
70. Waiving Points of Order Against the Conference Report on H.R. 333,
Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act, H.R. Res. 606, House Roll
Call Vote #478, 107th Cong. (Nov. 14, 2002), http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2002/roll478.xml.
71. Right before going out of session, House leaders again called a vote on the bill
stripped of the FACE amendment. The House passed this version (244–116) but without
expectation of further Senate movement. Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer
Protection Act, H.R. 333, House Roll Call Vote #484, 107th Cong. (Nov. 15, 2002),
http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2002/roll484.xml.
72. Rep. McCollum ran for Senate and lost. FED. ELECTION COMM’N, 2000 U.S.
SENATE RESULTS, http://www.fec.gov/pubrec/fe2000/2000senate.htm (last visited Nov. 12,
2004). After redistricting, Rep. Gekas encountered a longtime incumbent conservative
Democrat, Rep. Tim Holden, and lost. CLERK OF THE HOUSE OF REPS., STATISTICS OF THE
CONGRESSIONAL ELECTION OF NOV. 5, 2002, at 39 (2003).
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Nonetheless, early in the 108th Congress, Rep. Jim
Sensenbrenner (R-Wis.) reintroduced the omnibus bill, absent
the FACE amendment.73 The bill quickly passed the House on
74
March 19, 2003 (315–113).
After almost ten months, the House tried to force action in
the Senate. Lawmakers added the entire omnibus bill to a onepage reauthorization of Chapter 12 (family farmer bankruptcy),
75
which had already passed the Senate. The House passed this
76
bill by a vote of 265–99 in January 2004. Sen. Tom Daschle (DS.D.) expressed doubt in the press that the House’s approach
77
would be successful, and as of this writing, lawmakers have
78
made no further progress.
Thus, even though large majorities of lawmakers have
expressed support for the omnibus bankruptcy bill, it is not law.
The bankruptcy establishment has had very little direct
influence, notwithstanding attempts to provide substantive
79
input. As is discussed in the following two sections, however,
evaluating news media coverage offers another dimension to the
story of this bill’s long and tortured path.

73. Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2003, H.R. 975,
House Roll Call Vote #74, 108th Cong. (Mar. 19, 2003), http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2003/
roll074.xml.
74. That bill differs from the prior bill in that it includes a few legislative responses
to recent corporate scandals. See H. Amend. 8 to H.R. 975, 108th Cong. (2003) (amending
House Bill 975 to extend the reach-back period for rescinding fraudulent transfers and to
require courts, in some circumstances, “to reinstate retiree benefits that a corporate
debtor modified” just prior to filing), http://thomas.loc.gov/bss/d108/d108bill.html.
75. S. 1920, 108th Cong. (2004).
76. To Extend for 6 Months the Period for Which Chapter 12 of Title 11 of the
United States Code Is Reenacted, S. 1920, House Roll Call Vote #10, 108th Cong. (Jan. 28,
2004), http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2004/roll010.xml.
77. Dawn Kopecki, U.S. House GOP Tries to Resurrect Stalled Bankruptcy Bill,
DOW JONES BUS. WIRE, Jan. 28, 2004 (citing Daschle stating that Democrats have enough
votes to sustain a filibuster in Senate), available at 1/29/04 DJINS 12:37:00 (Westlaw).
78. See Molly M. Peterson, House Passes Bankruptcy Bill, but Senate Democrats
Object, CONG. DAILY, Jan. 29, 2004, available at 2004 WL 65987404. In the meantime,
Chapter 12 expired. See generally Melissa B. Jacoby, The Bankruptcy Code at Twenty-Five
and the Next Generation of Lawmaking, 78 AM. BANKR. L.J. 221, 226–230 (2004)
(describing legislative developments relating to Chapter 12 for family farmers).
79. Press Release, U.S. Sen. Russ Feingold, Statement of U.S. Senator Russ
Feingold on Legislation to Restore Chapter 12 Bankruptcy Protection for Farmers (Sept.
29, 2004), http://feingold.senate.gov/~feingold/statements/04/09/2004929B16.html.
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III. THE RELEVANCE OF MEDIA TREATMENT TO DEVELOPMENTS IN
BANKRUPTCY LEGISLATION
News media play a varied and complex role in American
80
lawmaking and policymaking. Courts increasingly use news in
81
82
judicial opinions and attribute statistics to news sources.
80. Scholars in other disciplines debate characterizations of news making as an
institution and its precise relationship to law and policy, but apparently do not debate its
importance. See, e.g., TIMOTHY E. COOK, GOVERNING WITH THE NEWS: THE NEWS MEDIA
AS A POLITICAL INSTITUTION 4 (1998) (characterizing news as a “political institution” and
discussing differences between political scientists’ and sociologists’ conception of
journalists); GAYE TUCHMAN, MAKING NEWS: A STUDY IN THE CONSTRUCTION OF REALITY
3–5 (1978) (describing news as “first and foremost a social institution”); see also HERBERT
J. GANS, DECIDING WHAT’S NEWS, 4–7 (1979) (characterizing content analysis of news
reporting as painting a “picture of America”); M. ETHAN KATSH, LAW IN A DIGITAL WORLD
9 (1995) (describing law and media as “two of society’s more powerful forces” and
expressing surprise that links between the two forces receive “negligible attention”);
MICHAEL SCHUDSON, THE SOCIOLOGY OF NEWS 6–7 (2003) (asserting that journalists
“construct” but do not “conjure” the world).
81. See, e.g., John J. Hasko, Persuasion in the Court: Nonlegal Materials in U.S.
Supreme Court Opinions, 94 LAW LIBR. J. 427 passim (2002) (studying the increased use
of nonlegal sources in U.S. Supreme Court decisions); Frederick Schauer & Virginia J.
Wise, Nonlegal Information and the Delegalization of Law, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 495 passim
(2000); see also David Nimmer, Appreciating Legislative History: The Sweet and Sour
Spots of the DMCA’s Commentary, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 909, 958 (2002) (describing Judge
Kozinski’s use of sources, including newspapers and magazines not in briefs or the
record); LaShanda D. Taylor, Creating A Causal Connection: From Prenatal Drug Abuse
to Imminent Harm, 25 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 383, 396–97 (1999) (noting family
court use of newspaper and magazine articles).
82. See, e.g., Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564, 567 & n.2 (2002) (citing New York
Times for Internet use estimate); A.D. Bedell Wholesale Co. v. Philip Morris Inc., 263 F.3d
239, 241–42 & n.9 (3d Cir. 2001) (citing New York Times for number of state lawsuits
against tobacco companies); Morrison v. Hall, 261 F.3d 896, 904 n.7 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing
Los Angeles Times for adult prisoner literacy rate and correlation between literacy and
recidivism); In re Mercer, 246 F.3d 391, 401 (5th Cir. 2001) (citing papers for estimates of
cost of bankruptcy per year in total and by household); Hutchins v. D.C., 188 F.3d 531,
570 n.35 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (Rogers & Tatel, JJ., dissenting) (citing Washington Post for
curfew effect on reducing juvenile crime); Middleton v. City of Flint, 92 F.3d 396, 407 (6th
Cir. 1996) (citing Los Angeles Times and New York Times for percentage of IndianAmerican owners in lodging and motel business); Roulette v. City of Seattle, 97 F.3d 300,
315 & n.5 (9th Cir. 1996) (Norris, Pregerson & Tashima, JJ., dissenting) (citing papers for
rich-poor disparity in U.S.); Carroll v. Comm’r, 71 F.3d 1228, 1230 & n.1 (6th Cir. 1995)
(citing Washington Post for prevalence of tax documents lost by IRS each year); United
States v. Smith, 27 F.3d 649, 668 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (Sentelle, J., dissenting) (citing papers
for estimated numbers of illegal immigrants and incarcerated illegal immigrants); United
States v. Milligan, 17 F.3d 177, 183–84 (6th Cir. 1994) (citing Los Angeles Times for
health insurance statistics); United States v. Garrett, 984 F.2d 1402, 1404 & n.1 (5th Cir.
1993) (citing New York Times for airport security firearm confiscation statistics); Hous.
Opportunities Made Equal, Inc. v. Cincinnati Enquirer, Inc., 943 F.2d 644, 666 & n.13
(6th Cir. 1991) (Keith, J., dissenting) (citing papers for prevalence of housing
discrimination); Hammer v. Gross, 932 F.2d 842, 852 (9th Cir. 1991) (Kozinski & Nelson,
JJ., concurring in part) (citing Los Angeles Times for drunk driving injury or death
statistics); McKinney v. Anderson, 924 F.2d 1500, 1507 & n.21 (9th Cir. 1991) (citing New
York Times for proportion of smokers in prison nationwide); People Against Nuclear
Energy v. NRC, 678 F.2d 222, 243 n.37 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (Wilkey, J., dissenting) (citing
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Lawyers engage in media management as part of their litigation
strategies.83 Scholars have studied media coverage of a range of
84
law and policy-related issues, including executive appointments,
85
86
judicial elections, presidential elections, and press accounts of
87
comments that victims’ families have made in capital cases.
The study of news coverage of legislation should be at least
as fruitful as studying these other lines of inquiry. Reporters and
88
legislators “coproduce” both news and policy. News media offer

Washington Post for average loss of life in coal mining).
83. See, e.g., RICHARD K. SHERWIN, WHEN LAW GOES POP: THE VANISHING LINE
BETWEEN LAW AND POPULAR CULTURE 147–48 (2000) (reviewing trial lawyers’
management of pretrial publicity and media messages to sway popular opinion and
“demoralize,” “antagonize,” and encourage plea bargaining); Tom Goldstein, The
Transformation of Legal Journalism, 66 U. CIN. L. REV. 895, 900 (1998) (examining
lawyers as spokespersons in media during high publicity trials); Peter J. Gardner, Media
at the Gates: Panic! Stress! Ethics?, VT. B.J., Sept. 2001, at 39, 40–41 (providing lawyers
with a succinct approach to media relations); Kateri Walsh, Engaging the Media: What
Lawyers Should Know When Talking to Reporters, OR. ST. B. BULL., Oct. 2001, at 9
(identifying several media related strategies lawyers can adopt to inform the general
public of the legal process).
84. Laurel Leff, The Making of a “Quota Queen”: News Media and the Bias of
Objectivity, in FEMINISM, MEDIA, AND THE LAW 27, 27–28 (Martha A. Fineman & Martha
T. McCluskey eds., 1997) (asserting that the objectivity norm “steered the media toward
familiar constructs about race and gender to make sense of the controversy over [Lani
Guinier’s] appointment,” and “enabled journalists to disclaim responsibility” for
characterizing Guinier as a left-wing extremist and a “quota queen”).
85. Joseph D. Kearney & Howard B. Eisenberg, The Print Media and Judicial
Elections: Some Case Studies from Wisconsin, 85 MARQ. L. REV. 593, 769–70, 775–77
(2002) (studying whether readers gained sufficient information from print media to vote
on the Abrahamson-Rose election and finding that information “seems to lack the
educative component needed to overcome the general public ignorance” about judges and
judicial elections).
86. See, e.g., JAMIESON & WALDMAN, supra note 7, at 4–7 (chronicling the media’s
coverage of the 2000 presidential election and the resulting lawsuit); SIDNEY KRAUS &
DENNIS DAVIS, THE EFFECTS OF MASS COMMUNICATION ON POLITICAL BEHAVIOR 58–59
(1976) (researching the television coverage of the presidential debates and its effect on the
voting public).
87. Samuel R. Gross & Daniel J. Matheson, What They Say at the End: Capital
Victims’ Families and the Press, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 486 (2003) (concluding that the
media gathers reactions from victims’ families as a fundamental component of assembling
an execution news story).
88. COOK, supra note 80, at 3, 10–13 (emphasizing that political actors and
journalists “interact in a constant but implicit series of negotiations over who controls the
agenda”); STEPHEN HESS, LIVE FROM CAPITOL HILL! STUDIES OF CONGRESS AND THE
MEDIA 104–07 (1991) (identifying Congress members’ efforts to influence media coverage,
despite research indicating that Congress “overestimate[s] the extent of television
coverage and hence its importance in the legislative and electoral processes”); KATSH,
supra note 80, at 9 (“[L]aw and media are intimately linked institutions.”); KRAUS
& DAVIS, supra note 86, at 123–24 (describing the centrality of the media to policymaking,
particularly since the rise of television imagery); SCHUDSON, supra note 80, at 21
(characterizing U.S. presidents as parajournalists); Frank R. Baumgartner et al., Media
Attention and Congressional Agendas, in DO THE MEDIA GOVERN?, supra note 7, at 349,
350 (“Sometimes one leads and sometimes the other, and often both are following the
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new legislation ideas,89 and legislators and others use the media
as outlets to construct and highlight public problems and to gain
90
support for particular solutions.

actions of some third party . . . .”); Robert H. Giles, The Media and Government
Regulation in the Great Tradition of Muckraking, 11 KANS. J.L. PUB. POL’Y 567, 570
(2002) (“[N]ews plays a formative role in the development of policy, of legislation, of
regulations, of reform and in the overlay of politics that is so characteristic of our
contemporary democracy.”); Jan Ellen Rein, Misinformation and Self-Deception in Recent
Long-Term Care Policy Trends, 12 J.L. & POL. 195, 233–34 (1996) (identifying the media
and insurance industry’s “profound effect on policy decisions at every level of
government”); Achilles Skordas, Hegemonic Custom?, in UNITED STATES HEGEMONY AND
THE FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 317, 323–24 (Michael Byers & Georg Nolte
eds., 2003) (describing the media as a source of “public conscience,” playing a role in
policymaking); Lucy A. Williams, Race, Rat Bites, and Unfit Mothers: How Media
Discourse Informs Welfare Legislation Debate, 22 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1159, 1174 (1995)
(arguing that media imaging affects poverty and welfare legislation).
89. See, e.g., LAURA E. GÓMEZ, MISCONCEIVING MOTHERS: LEGISLATORS,
PROSECUTORS, AND THE POLITICS OF PRENATAL DRUG EXPOSURE 32 (1997) (hypothesizing
bill sponsorship’s response in part to media construction of “crack baby”); Baumgartner et
al., supra note 88, at 350 (asserting that news media “attention is an important
determinant of which issues will manage to win space in the limited attentions of the
public and of Congress”); Peter H. Huang et al., Derivatives on TV: A Tale of Two
Derivatives Debacles in Prime-Time, 4 GREEN BAG 257, 266–67 (2001) (justifying partly
study of media coverage on fact that society’s lawmakers watch television and noting that
lawmakers cite news stories in pitches for reform); Nourse & Schacter, supra note 30, at
584 (surveying Senate congressional staffers on sources used to choose and produce
legislation). For a criticism of media’s lawmaking role, see WILLIS, supra note 10, at 154–
55 (concluding that media should not be held responsible for Congress’s agenda).
90. See CATER, supra note 6, at 13–21 (positing that the media is the “means by
which government explains itself to the people”); COOK, supra note 80, at 11, 82–84, 110–
15 (stating media “influence perceptions of public moods, and in other ways shape the
context of one legislator asking another for support” and discussing publicity functions of
Congress and use of news media to gain legislative power for both practical and
philosophical reasons while noting press secretaries find “the greater reach and credibility
of newspapers makes them more useful than self-generated communications such as
targeted mail or newsletters”); GÓMEZ, supra note 89, at 32 (portraying media as “free
advertising” for legislators’ projects); GARY C. WOODWARD, PERSPECTIVES ON AMERICAN
POLITICAL MEDIA 237 (1997) (arguing that popular media is crucial “when assessing the
forms of American political discourse”); Ben H. Bagdikian, Congress and the Media:
Partners in Propaganda, in CONGRESS AND THE NEWS MEDIA 388, 388–91 (A. William
Bluem ed., 1974); Shanto Iyengar, Framing Responsibility for Political Issues: The Case of
Poverty, in DO THE MEDIA GOVERN?, supra note 7, at 276, 276 (discussing the media’s
significant influence on public opinion); Nancy J. Knauer, How Charitable Organizations
Influence Federal Tax Policy: “Rent-Seeking” Charities or Virtuous Politicians?, 1996 WIS.
L. REV. 971, 1051 (“Legislators support the charitable community in order to generate the
favorable voter perception that they are acting in the public interest.”); Francis E. Rourke,
Congressional Use of Publicity, in CONGRESS AND THE NEWS MEDIA, supra, at 128, 128
(discussing the battle between the legislature and the executive for control of the media);
Deborah A. Stone, Causal Stories and the Formation of Policy Agendas, 104 POL. SCI. Q.
281, 282 (1989) (illustrating imagemaking in policymaking and the way political actors
portray problems to garner support for preferred solutions). See generally SAM KERNELL,
GOING PUBLIC: NEW STRATEGIES OF PRESIDENTIAL LEADERSHIP (2d ed. 1993) (outlining
politicians’ media management strategies); Shaviro, supra note 7, at 96 (“Press coverage
is a tool that [politicians] manipulate to enhance their reelection prospects and other
professional objectives.”). For an alternative way to build support for a legislative
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Researchers who have directly explored media coverage of
particular legislation have concluded that media coverage
91
increases the possibility of legislative attention, sometimes
92
regardless of the media portrayal’s accuracy. Media coverage
also has the potential to change lawmakers’ approaches to
93
dealing with an issue. Even if the media do not independently
determine or influence Congressional attention, they may
indirectly affect Congressional action, perhaps through
94
influencing public opinion. The media may also help change the
95
public’s understanding of legislation once enacted. Legal
proposal, see Leonard A. Jason & Thomas Rose, Influencing the Passage of Child
Passenger Restraint Legislation, 12 AM. J. OF COMMUNITY PSYCHOL. 485, 491–92 (1984)
(evaluating the impact of sending child automobile injury data to legislators on the eve of
legislative debate).
91. See, e.g., Baumgartner et al., supra note 88, at 350, 359–63 (studying the
relevance of both the nature and frequency of media coverage, and finding, among other
things, that media helped shift nuclear power debate toward negative safety issues, which
in turn led to policy changes, and that media and Congressional attention on urban
problems tracked each other).
92. Paul Colomy & Laura Ross Greiner, Making Youth Violence Visible: The News
Media and the Summer of Violence, 77 DENV. U. L. REV. 661, 668–71, 683–88 (2000)
(finding that the Denver Post gave higher profile and increased attention to crime during
the summer of 1993 and that this increased attention was followed by heightened
lawmaker receptiveness to legislation curbing violence even though crime statistics reveal
only a “small but unspectacular upturn” in violent crimes during the summer of 1993).
Professors Colomy and Greiner argue that the press was a “cultural entrepreneur” in its
narrative techniques and “played a critical role in making youth violence a salient public
issue.” Id. at 661, 679; GÓMEZ, supra note 89, at 29–33 (tracking press coverage and
California state legislative activity related to “crack babies” by studying media coverage of
drugs, pregnancy, and child abuse from 1985–1992 in two newspapers and fifty-seven
bills and related materials in the California Legislature). For reviews of GÓMEZ, supra
note 89, see generally Joseph R. Henry, 3 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 207 (1999) (book
review) (recommending that Gómez track changes in the media’s tone over time); Linda
G. Mills, Feminist Phallacies: The Politics of Prenatal Drug Exposure and the Power of
Law, 25 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 1215 (2000) (book review); Dorothy E. Roberts, Creating and
Solving the Problem of Drug Use During Pregnancy, 90 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1353
(2000) (book review); Karen D. Zivi, Who Is the Guilty Party? Rights, Motherhood, and the
Problem of Prenatal Drug Exposure, 34 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 237 (2000) (book review).
93. See Baumgartner et al., supra note 88, at 350, 362–63 (noting that changes in
governmental policy concerning societal issues are often preceded by media coverage of
the issue); Denise Scheberle, Radon and Asbestos: A Study of Agenda Setting and Causal
Stories, 22 POL’Y STUD. J. 74, 78, 82–83 (1994) (explaining that the media helped
transform legislative involvement in asbestos from industry promotion to a health
problem).
94. For example, Paul Burstein studied New York Times coverage and other
potential determinants of congressional sponsorship and support for equal employment
opportunity legislation between 1941 and 1972. PAUL BURSTEIN, DISCRIMINATION, JOBS,
AND POLITICS: THE STRUGGLE FOR EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY IN THE UNITED
STATES SINCE THE NEW DEAL 82–87 (1985). Burstein found only a weak correlation
between media coverage and legislative sponsorship and support, but observed that media
coverage may have had indirect effects, such as influencing public opinion. Id.
95. See, e.g., Sarah F. Russell, Covering Women and Violence: Media Treatment of
VAWA’s Civil Rights Remedy, 9 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 327, 328–29, 334–35, 352–54 (2003)

2004]

NEGOTIATING BANKRUPTCY LEGISLATION

1111

academics and professionals who want to understand, or perhaps
influence, the legislative process might miss a piece of the puzzle
if they do not investigate related news treatment.96
Many studies also implicitly recognize and evaluate media
97
Social scientists have
coverage effects on policymaking.
considered whether the media have roles in “agenda-setting,”
98
namely, helping to rank the salience of particular issues.
99
Researchers question how the media “frame” issues or problems

(finding shift in press coverage of civil rights provision in Violence Against Women Act, and
as result, finding the public less likely to conceptualize provision as civil rights or
discrimination law); see also Lisa Finnegan Abdolian & Harold Takooshian, The USA
PATRIOT Act: Civil Liberties, the Media, and Public Opinion, 30 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1429,
1436–40 (2003) (stating that “it wasn’t until months after its passage that reporters took a
hard look at the new law and began to question what its provisions meant” and observing a
split in focus of coverage between liberal and conservative leaning news organizations).
96. See KATSH, supra note 80, at 9 (describing law and media as “two of society’s
more powerful forces” and finding it “surprising . . . that the links between the two have
received negligible attention”); Filler, supra note 10, at 1756 n.80 (surveying myriad
articles that highlight the connection of the legal system to the public via the media and
noting the dearth of scholarship that explores this relationship).
97. See generally Sharon M. Friedman, Blueprint for Breakdown: Three Mile Island
and the Media Before the Accident, J. COMM., Winter 1981, at 116 (criticizing the biased
press coverage of the Three Mile Island nuclear facility before the major accident of
March 1979 and concluding that energy officials should invest more money and resources
in public relations to give the local community a better understanding of the risks and
benefits of nuclear energy); William A. Gamson & Kathryn E. Lasch, The Political Culture
of Social Welfare Policy, in EVALUATING THE WELFARE STATE: SOCIAL AND POLITICAL
PERSPECTIVES 397 (Shimon E. Spiro & Ephraim Yuchtman-Yaar eds., 1983) (presenting
several models of understanding clusters of ideas that describe a political culture to the
populace and identifying the various factors that make up the “culture” of an issue);
William A. Gamson & Andre Modigliani, Media Discourse and Public Opinion on Nuclear
Power: A Constructionist Approach, 95 AM. J. SOC. 1, 10–11 (1989) (analyzing relevant
material during “critical discourse moments” between 1945 and the late 1980s as
“indicat[ive] of the issue culture that people draw on to construct meaning” and offering
detailed narrative of media discourse, with an emphasis on interpretive packages
(progress, energy independence)).
98. For a foundational study, see Maxwell E. McCombs & Donald L. Shaw, The
Agenda-Setting Function of Mass Media, 36 PUB. OPINION Q. 176, 176–85 (1972)
(advocating the existence of high correlation between order of salience of public policy
issues as covered in media and as described by undecided voters, using content analysis
and surveys). See generally Everett M. Rogers et al., A Paradigmatic History of AgendaSetting Research, in DO THE MEDIA GOVERN?, supra note 7, at 225 (tracing the history of
scholarly research on the agenda-setting process from the 1930s to the late 1990s).
99. Professor Schudson defines framing as “principles of selection, emphasis, and
presentation composed of little tacit theories about what exists, what happens, and what
matters.” SCHUDSON, supra note 80, at 35; see also JAMIESON & WALDMAN, supra note 7,
at 122 (stating that the framing of issues is “the product of a give-and-take between
political actors and reporters”). For framing broader than media, see generally JOSEPH R.
GUSFIELD, THE CULTURE OF PUBLIC PROBLEMS: DRINKING-DRIVING AND THE SYMBOLIC
ORDER 1–4 (1981) (discussing how our culture transforms certain situations into public
problems and the inconsistencies between what actions are publicly criticized and
privately have become “routine behavior”).
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or focus on causal stories that lead to policy action.100 They have
used these techniques to study media coverage of many issues,
101
102
103
including crime waves, bridge collapse, affirmative action,
104
105
homelessness,
and a variety of poverty-related
welfare,
106
conditions, and they have sometimes approached these studies

100. See Stone, supra note 90, at 281–83, 299 (discussing how political actors portray
stories through the media in “ways calculated to gain support for their side”).
101. See, e.g., Joel Best, “Road Warriors” on “Hair Trigger Highways”: Cultural
Resources and the Media’s Construction of the 1987 Freeway Shootings Problem, 61 SOC.
INQUIRY 327, 331 (1991) (reporting on L.A. freeway violence and recounting alarming
terms used, including “sudden evolution,” “trend,” “wave,” “spate,” “spree,” “upsurge,”
“fad,” “rash,” “epidemic,” “plaguing,” and “reaching alarming proportions”); Mark
Fishman, Crime Waves as Ideology, 25 SOC. PROBS. 531, 532 (1977) (studying reporting on
crime against the elderly in New York City and finding a disproportionate focus on
gruesome crimes compared to crime statistics indicating drop in murders of the elderly);
see also Salma Ghanem & Dixie Evatt, Media Coverage and Public Concern About Crime:
An Exploration of the Second Dimension of Agenda-Setting, cited in Maxwell McCombs &
George Estrada, The News Media and the Pictures in Our Heads, in DO THE MEDIA
GOVERN?, supra note 7, at 237, 245–46 (tracking media coverage and public opinions
about crime in comparison to actual crime statistics); Hon. Ernestine S. Gray, The
Media—Don’t Believe the Hype, 14 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 45, 47 (2003) (declaring that
media reporting does not reflect the decline in juvenile crime).
102. See Robert A. Stallings, Media Discourse and the Social Construction of Risk, 37
SOC. PROB. 80, 81–82 (1990) (studying interstate bridge collapse coverage and the role of
experts in providing themes about risk and responsibility and finding one storyline on
causality and blame regarding the collapse, and another representing the collapse as an
example of a growing unsafe bridge problem).
103. See William A. Gamson & Andre Modigliani, The Changing Culture of
Affirmative Action, in THE POLITICAL SOCIOLOGY OF THE STATE: ESSAYS ON THE ORIGINS,
STRUCTURE, AND IMPACT OF THE MODERN STATE 289, 300–01, 304 (Richard G. Braungart
& Margaret M. Braungart eds., 1990) (evaluating seven issue-packages regarding
affirmative action coverage in television news, news magazines, editorial cartoons, and
syndicated columns).
104. See Gamson & Lasch, supra note 97, at 400–08 (using media coverage of welfare
to help establish “issue culture,” which in turn affects how lawmakers determine what
they should do about the poor, and identifying “welfare freeloaders,” “working poor,”
“poverty trap,” and “regulating the poor” issue packages in media and other materials).
105. See Blasi, supra note 7, at 221 (studying articles on homelessness in five major
newspapers and finding that four percent “attributed individualistic causes to
homelessness,” an extremely low percentage compared to poverty); Barrett A. Lee et al.,
Are the Homeless to Blame? A Test of Two Theories, 33 SOC. Q. 535, 537–38 (1992)
[hereinafter Lee et al., Homeless to Blame?] (finding the media to be a valuable public
arena to gauge public opinion and predict legislative developments on homelessness and
finding that the majority of reporting mentioning any cause of homelessness identified
structural determinants, such as a shrinking supply of low cost housing); see also Barrett
A. Lee et al., Public Beliefs About the Causes of Homelessness, 69 SOC. FORCES 253, 253,
257 (1990) (finding that beliefs about “causes of homelessness emphasize structural forces
and bad luck over individualistic factors”).
106. See Iyengar, supra note 90, at 279 (“Participants were generally least apt to
hold individuals causally responsible and most apt to consider society responsible [for
poverty] when the [television] news frame was societal.”). See generally Kevin B. Smith
& Lorene H. Stone, Rags, Riches, and Bootstraps: Beliefs about Causes of Wealth and
Poverty, 30 SOC. Q. 93, 93, 103 (1989) (noting that individualism has been widely accepted
as the metatheory for explaining wealth and poverty but is not as universally accepted as
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with a comparative perspective.107 These researchers are not
trying to determine the nature of a particular problem, such as
homelessness, although plenty of studies certainly focus on that
108
Rather, they explore media portrayal of
type of question.
homelessness and its effects on perceptions of problems and
109
support for solutions. These projects offer helpful explorations
of media coverage even if one is ambivalent about social
110
constructionism. They also offer important analytical tools to
is often assumed).
107. See Annette Benedict et al., Attitudes Toward the Homeless in Two New York
City Metropolitan Samples, J. VOLUNTARY ACTION RES., July-Dec. 1988, at 90, 91–92
(evaluating perceptions of the homeless among suburbanites working in New York City
and comparing perceptions of the elderly, welfare recipients, and the unemployed). See
generally George Wilson, Toward a Revised Framework for Examining Beliefs About the
Causes of Poverty, 37 SOC. Q. 413 (1996) (analyzing reports on welfare, homelessness, and
migrant workers, finding that groups have not been uniformly framed, and concluding
media messages alter individuals’ perceptions derived from personal experiences). See
also Blasi, supra note 7, at 221 (noting the adage that “the media provide instruction to
the public” and that public opinion “surveys determines [sic] how well the lessons have
been learned”). Early agenda-setting studies relied to some extent on a comparative
approach, ranking salience among several issues. For a review, see McCombs & Estrada,
supra note 101, at 237–38.
108. See, e.g., Marta Elliott & Lauren J. Krivo, Structural Determinants of
Homelessness in the United States, 38 SOC. PROBS. 113, 114 (1991) (describing two
explanations: personal problems and structural conditions); Thomas J. Main, Analyzing
Evidence for the Structural Theory of Homelessness, 18 J. URB. AFF. 449, 450, 456 (1996)
(finding fault in structural theory, based on the high personal disability rate among the
homeless).
109. See, e.g., Lawrence Bobo, Social Responsibility, Individualism, and
Redistributive Policies, 6 SOC. FORUM 71, 72, 84–87 (1991) (concluding that individual
responsibility theory dominates public opinion); Kay Young McChesney, Family
Homelessness: A Systemic Problem, J. SOC. ISSUES, No. 4, at 191, 191, 200 (1990) (noting
that perceptions of homelessness as a personal or family problem may lead people to
conclude that the federal government need not be involved); see also GUSFIELD, supra note
99, at 13 (“Public problems have a shape which is understood in a larger context of a
social structure in which some versions of ‘reality’ have greater power and authority to
define and describe that ‘reality’ than do others.”); ALAN IRWIN, RISK AND THE CONTROL OF
TECHNOLOGY: PUBLIC POLICIES FOR ROAD TRAFFIC SAFETY IN BRITAIN AND THE UNITED
STATES 28–29 (1986) (discussing problems associated with the public’s participation in
technical decisionmaking); Best, supra note 101, at 327 (“Problems can always be depicted
in more than one way: rape as sex crime or crime of violence; marijuana as a cause of
psychosis, a precursor to hard drugs, or a threat to economic productivity . . . .”); Gray,
supra note 101, at 47–48 (studying the limited media coverage of juvenile crime and
arguing that media portrayal of crime and race leads to more punitive responses to
juvenile problems).
110. For explanations of social constructionism, see, e.g., Best, supra note 101, at 327
(“Explaining how and why particular images of problems emerge has become a central
task for constructionist analysts.”); Theresa Glennon, Knocking Against the Rocks:
Evaluating Institutional Practices and the African-American Boy, 5 J. HEALTH CARE L.
& POL’Y 10, 36 (2002) (“The basic insight of social construction theory is that much of
what we accept as fact is, rather, a culturally influenced interpretation of phenomena.”).
For commentary on, and criticism of, social constructionism, see, e.g., IAN HACKING, THE
SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF WHAT? 2–3 (1999) (noting that “social construction analyses do
not always liberate,” can have the opposite effect—as in the case of anorexia—and
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legal scholars interested in a broader conception of the
determinants of legislative developments.
The parties on whom reporters rely to shape and fill their
111
stories deserve attention as well. Sources “are the deep, dark
secret of the power of the press”; they might even lead the dance
112
They have a powerful
between reporters and themselves.
113
opportunity to shape the way a problem or issue is understood.
114
Players readily become repeat players if they follow the rules.
generally only liberate “those who are on the way to being liberated”). See generally Steve
Woolgar & Dorothy Pawluch, Ontological Gerrymandering: The Anatomy of Social Probs.
Explanations, 32 SOC. PROBS. 214 (1985) (examining several examples of social problems
to provide critical commentary on the social constructionist arguments used to explain
them).
111. See, e.g., RICHARD V. ERICSON ET AL., NEGOTIATING CONTROL: A STUDY OF NEWS
SOURCES 3–4 (1989) (recognizing the power of a news source to shape the public’s
perception of an event or issue in society); LEON V. SIGAL, REPORTERS AND OFFICIALS: THE
ORGANIZATION AND POLITICS OF NEWSMAKING 123–25 (1973) (analyzing news source
diversity); CAROL H. WEISS & ELEANOR SINGER, REPORTING OF SOCIAL SCIENCE IN THE
NATIONAL MEDIA 175–79 (1988) (studying social science coverage and sourcing in national
press and three weekly news magazines); Jane Delano Brown et al., Invisible Power:
Newspaper News Sources and the Limits of Diversity, 64 JOURNALISM Q. 45, 47, 49, 53
(1987) (studying front page stories and sourcing from national press and four North
Carolina papers); Hugh M. Culbertson, Veiled News Sources—Who and What Are They?
NEWS RES. BULL., May 1975, at 5, 5–6, 8–10, 13 (studying source attribution patterns in
twelve newspapers); Daniel C. Hallin et al., Sourcing Patterns of National Security
Reporters, 70 JOURNALISM Q. 753, 753–54 (1993); Jim Naureckas & Janine Jackson,
Happily Ever NAFTA? Extra! Update, October 1993, in THE FAIR READER: AN EXTRA!
REVIEW OF PRESS AND POLITICS IN THE ‘90S, at 149, 149–50 (Jim Naureckas & Janine
Jackson eds., 1996) (reviewing sourcing in NAFTA stories, and observing pro-NAFTA bias
among majority of sources, with scarce representation of environmentalists and trade
unionists); Jim Naureckas & Janine Jackson, NAFTA’s Knee-Jerk Press, Extra! Update,
January/February 1994, in THE FAIR READER, supra, at 151, 151 (discussing Sen. Byron
Dorgan’s analysis of Washington Post editorials and op-eds on NAFTA, in which he found
a pro-NAFTA bias of nearly seven to one).
112. SCHUDSON, supra note 80, at 54, 134; see also John J. Oslund, The Media and
Government Regulation: Guarding the Hen House, 11 KAN. J.L. PUB. POL’Y 559, 561
(2002) (arguing that the reporter-source relationship is “alternately symbiotic,
confrontational, clandestine and political”).
113. See, e.g., EDWARD S. HERMAN & NOAM CHOMSKY, MANUFACTURING CONSENT:
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE MASS MEDIA 18, 22 (1988) (noting that powerful
bureaucracies acting as sources make information collection cheaper and easier for
media); David Knoke & Edward O. Laumann, The Social Organization of National Policy
Domains: An Exploration of Some Structural Hypotheses, in SOCIAL STRUCTURE AND
NETWORK ANALYSIS 255, 259 (Peter V. Marsden & Nan Lin eds., 1982) (arguing that “the
social structure of a national policy domain is primarily determined by the network of
access to trustworthy and timely information about policy matters”); Stallings, supra note
102, at 87 (asserting that the relationship between journalists and sources helps explain
which causes get identified).
114. See, e.g., SCHUDSON, supra note 80, at 52 (observing that journalists seek
experts that satisfy the press’s “operational bias” (citing Janet E. Steele, Experts and the
Operational Bias of Television News: The Case of the Persian Gulf War, 72 JOURNALISM
& MASS COMM. Q. 799 (1995))); WEISS & SINGER, supra note 111, at 45 (identifying that
the “veterans of the press” effect leads to a finding that fifty-seven percent of those quoted
in articles had been quoted “more than twenty times before”); WILLIS, supra note 10, at

2004]

NEGOTIATING BANKRUPTCY LEGISLATION

1115

The system rewards those who reach out to the media.115
Speaking in quotable sentences and having a “flair for the
116
dramatic” certainly help as well. Sources might be particularly
influential in shaping stories about a legal system or issue if the
117
Ultimately, the research
details are relatively unfamiliar.
suggests that sources many be able to play a role in legislative
developments if they gain the trust of reporters and collaborate
with them to help shape the media discourse.
To gain insight on the role of the news media with respect to
the omnibus bankruptcy legislation, I studied coverage of the bill
in three high circulation and influential national newspapers: the
Wall Street Journal, the New York Times, and the Washington
118
Post. These papers are routinely chosen for analysis by a wide
145 (describing reporters’ reliance on a small group of experts for stories, creating a
rolodex effect); Brown et al., supra note 111, at 45–48 (arguing that reporters’ traditional
sources satisfy two important criteria: availability and suitability).
115. WEISS & SINGER, supra note 111, at 26–29, 46–48 (concluding that the majority
of reporters who write on social-science issues cite to or quote scientists who actively seek
media coverage); see also SCHUDSON, supra note 80, at 135 (elucidating the college and
university impetus to engage in outreach with media, particularly “when good things
happen”); SIGAL, supra note 111, at 120–22 (finding that only one-fourth of the stories are
derived of reporter’s own research initiative); Douglas L. Colbert, Broadening
Scholarship: Embracing Law Reform and Justice, 52 J. LEGAL EDUC. 540, 556–57 (2002)
(describing the dynamic between media reporters and a professor who was forthcoming
with his research efforts); Al Kamen, In the Loop, WASH. POST, Apr. 3, 2001, at A19
(reporting on Harvard Law School’s outreach to media to increase the citation of
professors).
116. WEISS & SINGER, supra note 111, at 47; see also Gamson & Lasch, supra note 97,
at 401 (describing the process by which symbolic actors and organizations influence their
portrayal in the media and noting that “an apt metaphor or catchphrase will be picked up
and amplified through the media—serving the interest of both sources and journalists”).
For an evaluation of soundbiting, particularly with respect to television, see generally
Daniel C. Hallin, Sound Bite News: Television Coverage of Elections, 1968–1988, 42 J.
COMM. 5-24 (1992), reprinted in DO THE MEDIA GOVERN?, supra note 7, at 57.
117. See generally MELVIN L. DEFLEUR & SANDRA BALL-ROKEACH, THEORIES OF
MASS COMMUNICATION (3d ed. 1975) (commenting that the relative importance of media
discourse depends on readily available meaning-generating experiences in readers’
everyday lives); S.J. Ball-Rokeach & M.L. DeFleur, A Dependency Model of Mass-Media
Effects, 3 COMM. RES. 3 (1976) (asserting that media’s often incomplete reporting
immediately following unexpected events creates ambiguity in the audience and
discussing media’s subsequent role in ambiguity resolution).
118. See, e.g., Audit Bureau of Circulations, Top 150 Newspapers by Largest
Reported Circulation, at http://www.accessabc.com/reader/top100.htm (Nov. 12, 2004)
(ranking the Wall Street Journal with the second highest circulation, the New York Times
with the third, and the Washington Post with the fifth); Matthew Rose, Most Top
Newspapers in U.S. Post Little Change in Circulation, WALL ST. J., Nov. 6, 2002, at B4
(same). The New York Times claims to have the highest circulation of any seven day
newspaper. N.Y. Times, The Best of Both Worlds, at http://www.nytadvertising.com/
was/circulation/pages/contentCirculation/0,1013,,00.html?l1Id=5 (last visited Nov. 12,
2004) (citing Audit Bureau of Circulations Publisher’s Statement for six months ending
March 31, 2004). The Wall Street Journal declares a circulation of over 2.1 million as of
the six months ending March 31, 2004. Dow Jones & Co., The Wall Street Journal Global
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range of researchers.119 Other media outlets and local newspapers
120
These three national
would have enriched the analysis.
newspapers offer a good initial inquiry, however, given the
growing uniformity of national news, the consolidation of media
ownership, and the political power of these particular
121
publications. I studied what I identified as the most relevant
treatments of the omnibus bankruptcy bill in these three
122
sources and focused on news and commentary between August
Franchise, at http://www.dowjones.com/TheCompany/FactSheets.htm (last visited Nov.
12, 2004) (citing Audit Bureau of Circulations Publisher’s Statement for six months
ending March 31, 2004).
119. See, e.g., BURSTEIN, supra note 94, at 202–03 (using New York Times articles as
reprinted in the New York Times Index); WEISS & SINGER, supra note 111, at 179
(examining the New York Times, the Wall Street Journal, the Washington Post, and three
newsweeklies); Brown et al., supra note 111, at 47 (performing content analysis on the
New York Times and the Washington Post, among others); Lee et al., Homeless to Blame?,
supra note 105, at 537–38 (1992) (studying the New York Times and the Washington Post
coverage of homelessness); Russell, supra note 95, at 329 & n.6 (including the Wall Street
Journal, the Washington Post, and the New York Times); Stallings, supra note 102, at 81
(focusing on the New York Times); Wilson, supra note 107, at 415–16, 425 app. 1
(analyzing the top five circulation newspapers); see also HERMAN & CHOMSKY, supra note
113, at 132–37 & tbls. 3-1 to 3-3 (studying the New York Times reporting for systematic
media bias); SIGAL, supra note 111, at 5–6 (singling out the New York Times and
Washington Post for study).
120. See, e.g., Best, supra note 101, at 328–29 (analyzing several national and local
papers as well as television news journals for freeway violence study); Brown et al., supra
note 111, at 47 (using national sources and North Carolina papers for content analysis); J.
William Spencer & Elizabeth Triche, Media Constructions of Risk and Safety: Differential
Framings of Hazard Events, 64 SOC. INQUIRY, 199, 199–200 (1994) (studying a New
Orleans newspaper for a comparative assessment of “local versus nonlocal consequences”).
121. See Ben H. Bagdikian, The U.S. Media: Supermarket or Assembly Line?, in DO
THE MEDIA GOVERN?, supra note 7, at 66, 68–70 (concluding that the consolidation of
media outlets into relatively few hands has resulted in a homogenization of information
that crowds out independent voices); see also JAMIESON & WALDMAN, supra note 7, at 96–
97 (arguing that the political impact of Sunday television talk shows is rivaled only by the
New York Times and the Washington Post); SCHUDSON, supra note 80, at 121–22
(describing the effects of corporate ownership newspapers’ uniform content); Who Owns
What, Columbia Journalism Review, at http://www.cjr.org/tools/owners/ (last visited Nov.
12, 2004) (providing links to information about major media holdings).
122. Cf. Best, supra note 101, at 328–29 (examining “the most significant
treatments—both local and national—of the freeway violence problem” rather than
collecting random sample); cf. see also Gross & Matheson, supra note 87, at 487–88
(explaining that a set of newspaper articles are not representative or exhaustive, but are
“interesting and suggestive”); Nourse & Schacter, supra note 30, at 580–81 (justifying a
case study method rather than a large quantitative sample study for examining the
legislative process). The term “bankruptcy” appears with incredible frequency, including
references to specific cases or as a pejorative term (both in and out of newspapers). See,
e.g., Laurence H. Tribe, The Unbearable Wrongness of Bush v. Gore, 19 CONST. COMMENT.
571, 573 (2002) (referring to the “embarrassing bankruptcy” of the Supreme Court’s
rationale in Bush v. Gore). A random sample of the more than 12,000 pieces mentioning
“bankruptcy” therefore would have been fruitless. Research assistants entered into a
spreadsheet basic information about these 12,000-plus items. The sample was narrowed
based on subject coding. A subsequent review by the Author of omitted pieces resulted in
the recharacterization of approximately fifty items. One item was added that is
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31, 1997 and August 31, 2001.123 From these news outlets, within
this period, three striking frames emerged.
IV. THREE PROMINENT EMERGING FRAMES OF BANKRUPTCY
A. A Campaign Finance Story: Industry Power, Money, and
Predation
As in earlier pieces noted in the beginning of Part II, certain
quoted sources, such as industry representatives and other bill
proponents, sought to frame discussions of bankruptcy in terms
124
125
of debtor irresponsibility and declining bankruptcy stigma.
The bankruptcy bill, they asserted, simply fixes the flaw in the
126
current system that encourages irresponsibility, but will not
inexplicably missing from the Lexis archive of New York Times pieces.
123. The start date slightly precedes the introduction of the initial bankruptcy bills
in the 105th Congress, and the end date was chosen at a time when it seemed virtually
certain the bill would have passed.
124. See, e.g., Kathleen Day, Senate Votes to Toughen Bankruptcy: 36 Democrats
Support Measure Backed by Bush, WASH. POST, Mar. 16, 2001, at A1 [hereinafter Day,
Senate Votes to Toughen Bankruptcy] (“Wealthier filers walk away from billions of dollars
in debt each year, regardless of their ability to pay . . . .”); Eric Schmitt, Senate Approves a
Bill to Toughen Bankruptcy Rules: Higher Bar for Debtors, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3, 2000, at A1
[hereinafter Schmitt, Higher Bar for Debtors] (“‘Despite their ability to pay, wealthier
filers walk away from an estimated $3 billion per year in debt.’” (quoting Edward L.
Yingling)); Seelye, Republicans Agree to New Limits, supra note 47 (referring to “abusive
spending practices of those who exploit the Federal bankruptcy code for personal gain or
convenience” (quoting Sen. Charles E. Grassley)); Philip Shenon, How Bill in Senate
Would Add Hurdles to Erasing of Debt, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 14, 2001, at A1 [hereinafter
Shenon, Bill Would Add Hurdles to Erasing of Debt] (referring to “‘the unscrupulous who
abuse our system’” (quoting Sen. Orrin Hatch)); Philip Shenon, Senate Rejects Industry
Curbs on Bankruptcy, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8, 2001, at A18 [hereinafter Shenon, Senate
Rejects Industry Curbs] (“Unnecessary and abusive bankruptcy costs everyone.” (quoting
Sen. Joseph Biden Jr.)).
125. See, e.g., Steve France, Editorial, Big Brother Bankruptcy, WASH. POST, Mar. 21,
2000, at A25 (citing Sen. Hatch’s floor statements lamenting the declining stigma); Robert
D. Hershey Jr., Creditors Lead Push to Curb Bankruptcy, N.Y. TIMES, May 10, 1998, at
BU10 (“‘The only reasonable explanation [for the increase in bankruptcy filings] is that
the stigma of bankruptcy is all but dead . . . .’” (quoting Rep. Gekas)); Peter Pae &
Stephanie Stoughton, Personal Bankruptcy Filings Hit Record: Easy Credit Blamed,
Congress May Act, WASH. POST, June 7, 1998, at A1 (“[N]ow [bankruptcy is] no big deal.
It’s a way of doing business. I can’t completely explain why the stigma is gone, but it’s
gone.’” (quoting Rep. Bill McCollum)); Katharine Q. Seelye, Panel to Vote on Measure to
Tighten Bankruptcy Law, N.Y. TIMES, May 14, 1998, at A22 [hereinafter Seelye, Vote on
Measure to Tighten Bankruptcy] (citing Rep. Gekas as arguing that the stigma of filing
bankruptcy has all but vanished).
126. Sources characterized current law as a “free ride” or an “easy out” fraught with
“loopholes” that lets “big spenders walk away from their debts” and was “as convenient as
going into a 7-Eleven.” Kathleen Day, Bankruptcy Bill Goes to House Floor, WASH. POST,
May 5, 1999, at E1 [hereinafter Day, Bankruptcy Bill Goes to House Floor] (characterizing
bankruptcy bill as “‘clos[ing] the loopholes’” used by the wealthy to get out of debt
(quoting Sen. Grassley)); Kathleen Day, House Passes Tougher Debt Rules: Clinton
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affect access for legitimate users.127 Unlike in some of the earlier
stories, however, the sentiments did not shape the reporting. To
the contrary, some journalists covered the omnibus bankruptcy
128
bill as a story of industry influence. For example, in a front
page Wall Street Journal story in June 1998, Card Games: As
Bankruptcies Surge, Creditors Lobby Hard to Get Tougher Laws,
reporter Jacob Schlesinger attributed the likely success of the
bankruptcy bill to a “multimillion-dollar public-relations and
129
lobbying blitz run largely by companies with the most to gain.”

Opposes Bankruptcy Bill, WASH. POST, Oct. 13, 2000, at E3 [hereinafter Day, House
Passes Tougher Debt Rules] (claiming the bill “‘strikes the balance needed to strengthen
the safety net for people who need a fresh start after a hardship while closing the
loopholes exploited by big spenders’” (quoting Sen. Grassley)); Dawn Kopecki, Law Would
Require Credit Counseling: Bankruptcy Filers Would Face Two Rounds of Classes, WALL
ST. J., Apr. 16, 2001, at B3F (claiming bankruptcy is thought of as an “‘easy out’” (quoting
Sen. Grassley)); Caroline E. Mayer, Bankruptcy Bill Passed by Senate: Wiping Out Debts
Would Be Harder, WASH. POST, Sept. 24, 1998, at E1 [hereinafter Mayer, Bankruptcy Bill
Passed by Senate] (quoting Sen. Grassley); Mayer, Negotiators Complete Bankruptcy
Reform Bill, supra note 47 (“The measure ‘sends a clear signal for those who have abused
the bankruptcy code that the free ride is over.’” (quoting Sen. Grassley)); Schlesinger, As
Bankruptcies Surge, supra note 3 (quoting Sen. Grassley); Schmitt, Higher Bar for
Debtors, supra note 124 (“‘It was time for Congress to close the loopholes that let big
spenders walk away from debts . . . .’” (quoting Sen. Grassley)); id. (“[The] bill closes
loopholes and ends unfairness in provisions that are totally being abused and making a
mockery out of legitimate bankruptcy.” (quoting Sen. Sessions)); Katharine Q. Seelye,
House Approves Legislation to Curb Laws on Bankruptcy, N.Y. TIMES, June 11, 1998, at
A22 (“Filing for bankruptcy ‘shouldn’t be as convenient as going into a 7-Eleven.’”
(quoting Rep. Tim J. Roemer)); Katharine Q. Seelye, Senate Votes to Curb Bankruptcy
Abuse by Consumers, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 24, 1998, at A25 [hereinafter Seelye, Senate to
Curb Bankruptcy Abuse] (quoting Sen. Grassley).
127. Katherine Ackley & Jacob M. Schlesinger, House Panel Approves BankruptcyReform Bill, WALL ST. J., Apr. 29, 1999, at B16 (“‘This legislation simply requires that
individuals filing for bankruptcy who are capable of repaying even a portion of their debts
do so . . . .’” (quoting Rep. Gekas)); Tom Hamburger, House Legislators Pass Measure to
Curb Abuse of Bankruptcy-Protection Laws, WALL ST. J., Mar. 2, 2001, at B2 [hereinafter
Hamburger, House Measure to Curb Abuse] (reporting that Joe Rubin, a former Gekas
staffer now with the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, “told wavering House members that
‘this bill is targeted solely at wealthy debtors who have abused the bankruptcy system
and can afford to repay their debts’”); Labaton, Promised Veto, supra note 60 (“‘We
guarantee a fresh start to any American who needs it . . . .’” (quoting Rep. Gekas)); Jacob
M. Schlesinger, House Approves Bankruptcy Overhaul amid Criticism Bill May Be Too
Tough, WALL ST. J., May 6, 1999, at A28 (“The risk of squeezing the truly needy . . . ‘is
very minimal.’” (quoting Rep. Gekas)).
128. As early as January 1998, political reporter Bill McAllister, who admittedly
focuses on lobbying for the Washington Post, reported that “a powerful coalition of credit
card and financial companies is promising to make the seemingly arcane intricacies of
bankruptcy law one of the most heavily lobbied issues of 1998.” Bill McAllister, Reopening
Chapter 7, WASH. POST, Jan. 1, 1998, at A23 (discussing lobbyists, public relations firms,
and heavy hitters and describing the power of the American Financial Services
Association, whose representative “promise[d] lots of ‘old-fashioned lobbying,’” which
McAllister translated into “financial CEOs buttonholing lawmakers and urging them to
put the screws to” bankruptcy filers).
129. Schlesinger, As Bankruptcies Surge, supra note 3 (explaining how consumer
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The industry influence frame thrust campaign contribution
and credit-card lending statistics to the forefront even though
130
Reporters
they are not technically bankruptcy issues.
questioned the existence of a connection between candidate or
131
party fundraising and bankruptcy bill support. They observed
that “the campaign contributions and lobbying muscle come

lending coalition helped “nuke” the Bankruptcy Commission’s report, drafted parts of the
House Bill, funded and widely advertised research justifying reform, underwrote opinion
polls to show public support for reform, retained expert lobbyists, increased campaign
contributions for legislators, and tried to pressure another group into taking a less
negative stance toward the legislation). Around the same time, Robert Cwyklik of the
Wall Street Journal wrote an in-depth story on industry-funded research, with special
focus on a credit-industry-funded academic center that produced studies supporting the
industry’s bankruptcy reform requests. Robert Cwiklik, Ivory Tower Inc.: When Research
and Lobbying Mesh, WALL ST. J., June 9, 1998, at B1.
130. See, e.g., Kathleen Day, Foes of Bankruptcy Bill Point Finger at Credit Card
Issuers, WASH. POST, Feb. 28, 2001, at E1 [hereinafter Day, Foes of Bankruptcy Bill]
(reporting that a nonprofit consumer group issued a “report showing that in addition to
shipping an estimated 3.3 billion mail offers [for credit-cards] last year,” the industry also
“expanded available credit beyond consumer demand”); Day, House Passes Bankruptcy
Limits, supra note 4 (reporting that total federal campaign contributions for the 2000
election year almost doubled from those in 1996); Day, House Passes Tougher Debt Rules,
supra note 126 (reporting on the $6 million in campaign contributions made by retailers,
banks, and credit-card companies in the first six months of 2000); Day, Senate Votes to
Toughen Bankruptcy, supra note 124 (reporting similar figures); Mayer, Bankruptcy Bill
Passed By Senate, supra note 126 (reporting similar contributions); Peter Pae, House
Rewrites Bankruptcy Laws: Measure Would Restrict Personal Filings, WASH. POST, June
11, 1998, at A1 (reporting that “banks, consumer finance companies and credit card
issuers made about $6.7 million in campaign contributions in the past year”); Seelye,
Senate to Curb Bankruptcy Abuse, supra note 126 (reporting on credit-card profitability
and the potential profits from the bill’s passage).
131. See, e.g., Tom Hamburger et al., Influence Market: Industries that Backed Bush
Are Now Seeking Return on Investment, WALL ST. J., Mar. 6, 2001, at A1 (analyzing
whether the credit industry expected and would receive payback from the Bush
Administration by the Administration’s support of the bankruptcy bill); John D.
McKinnon, Senate Hopeful in Florida Banks on His Role in Bankruptcy Bill, WALL ST. J.,
Sept. 26, 2000, at A28 (considering Rep. McCollum’s reliance on credit industry funds for
Senate campaign financing and his leading role with the bankruptcy bill); Dan Morgan &
Kathleen Day, Early Wins Embolden Lobbyists for Business: Groups to Push Much
Broader Agenda, WASH. POST, Mar. 11, 2001, at A1 (claiming that business lobbyists are
hoping to “cash[] in” on a favorable business climate created by the Bush Administration);
Jacob M. Schlesinger, Bush to Support Bankruptcy Bill that Clinton Vetoed Last Year,
WALL ST. J., Feb. 6, 2001, at A4 (“President Bush will soon give an important boost to the
credit-card industry and other lenders, endorsing their efforts to tighten bankruptcy laws
that were blocked by former President Clinton.”); Susan Schmidt, Torricelli’s Money Push
Also Raises Some Hackles: Business Fills Senate Democratic Coffers, WASH. POST, June
17, 2000, at A1 (questioning whether Sen. Torricelli supported the bill because he was
“courting” industry for party fundraising); Philip Shenon, Hard Lobbying on Debtor Bill
Pays Dividend, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 13, 2001, at A1 [hereinafter Shenon, Hard Lobbying
Pays Dividend] (“[L]obbying campaign led by credit card companies and banks that gave
millions of dollars in political donations to members of Congress and contributed
generously to President Bush’s 2000 campaign is close to its long-sought goal of
overhauling the nation’s bankruptcy system.”).
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mainly from the politically powerful financial community.”132
They were quick to note that the bill’s movement “underscores
133
the new influence business has in Washington,” and constitutes
134
“a huge success for banks, credit-card companies and retailers,”
who “boast some of the best-connected lobbyists on Capitol
135
Hill.”
Even stories with a broader focus used language suggesting
credit industry power and sometimes even aggression. The
136
137
“championed,”
and
legislation was “vigorously sought,”
138
by the credit industry. The credit industry
“pushed”
139
140
“swarmed,” “fanned out across Capitol Hill,” and “lobbied
141
hard” through a “multimillion-dollar lobbying, research and
142
advertising campaign” “to ensure . . . it would be first in line to

132. Schmitt, Higher Bar for Debtors, supra note 124.
133. Day, Senate Votes to Toughen Bankruptcy, supra note 124.
134. Seelye, Republicans Agree to New Limits, supra note 47; see also Pae &
Stoughton, supra note 125 (describing the push for bankruptcy reform by creditors).
135. Philip Shenon, Senate Democrats Stall Bankruptcy Bill, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17,
2001, at A11 [hereinafter Shenon, Senate Democrats].
136. Mayer, Bankruptcy Bill Passed by Senate, supra note 126; Mayer, Negotiators
Complete Bankruptcy Reform Bill, supra note 47; Helen Dewar & Kathleen Day, Senate
Approves Bankruptcy Bill: Industry-Sought Overhaul Passes 83–14, WASH. POST, Feb. 3,
2000, at A1 (stating that bankruptcy overhaul “was sought by the credit card industry” to
control escalating filings).
137. Philip Shenon, Bankruptcy Measure Gains on a Lopsided Senate Vote By 80–19,
Chamber Acts to Cut Off Debate, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15, 2001, at A22 [hereinafter Shenon,
Measure Gains on a Lopsided Senate Vote]; Shenon, Bill Would Add Hurdles to Erasing of
Debt, supra note 124 (claiming bill is being championed by the credit industry as a cureall for their problems that are due to the increase in bankruptcy filings); Shenon, Senate
Democrats, supra note 135.
138. Bankruptcy-Reform Bill Dies with a “Pocket Veto”, WALL ST. J., Dec. 20, 2000, at
1; Day, House Passes Bankruptcy Limits, supra note 4; Hamburger, House Measure to
Curb Abuse, supra note 127 (stating that businesses have “pushed” for bankruptcy system
overhaul for three years); Eric Schmitt, Senators Back Major Overhaul of Bankruptcy,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8, 2000, at A1 (reporting on lobbyists who were promising a “furious”
campaign to override the potential veto).
139. Katharine Q. Seelye, House to Vote Today on Legislation for Bankruptcy
Overhaul, N.Y. TIMES, June 10, 1998, at A18 [hereinafter Seelye, House to Vote on
Bankruptcy Overhaul] (“[S]cores of lawyers and industry lobbyists swarmed over the
House and Senate Judiciary Committees as they gaveled the bankruptcy bill to
approval.”).
140. Philip Shenon, Bill to Tighten Bankruptcy Gets a Push: Democratic Senate
Helps Break a Logjam, N.Y. TIMES, June 12, 2001, at C1 [hereinafter Shenon, Bill to
Tighten Bankruptcy Gets a Push].
141. Kathleen Day, Bankruptcy Bill Put on Fast Track: Republicans Say Law Would
Curb Abuses, WASH. POST, Feb. 8, 2001, at E1; Day, Senate Votes to Toughen Bankruptcy,
supra note 124.
142. Jacob M. Schlesinger, Senate Approves Overhaul of Bankruptcy Code, WALL ST.
J., Sept. 24, 1998, at A2; see also Ackley & Schlesinger, supra note 127 (stating that
“credit-card companies and other lenders have lobbied hard over the past two years to
toughen the Bankruptcy Code,” and reporting that even Rep. Henry Hyde found the
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collect from bankruptcy filers,”143 and to “recoup billions of
144
dollars.” Dan Morgan of the Washington Post described creditor
representatives who “patrolled” outside of key House votes and
145
A photograph
engaged in “behind-the-scenes-maneuvering.”
accompanying one New York Times article had little to do with
bankruptcy and everything to do with lobbying power: the
picture featured a grouping of lobbyists who “can regularly be
found in the Senate Reception Room, just off the Senate chamber,
and there was no exception yesterday as the bankruptcy
overhaul legislation long championed by the banking and credit146
card industries moved toward final passage.” Stories of creditor
147
infighting and internal fractures to the coalition also emerged,
notwithstanding the credit industry’s general assertion of a
148
unified position and interest in bankruptcy.
credit-industry supported legislation heavy handed); Schroeder & Schlesinger, supra note
4 (“[C]redit-card companies spent heavily on lobbying, advertising, and research over the
past year to promote the most sweeping overhaul of the federal bankruptcy code in 20
years.”).
143. Pae, supra note 130; see also Peter Pae & Stephanie Stoughton, Senate’s
Bankruptcy Bill Gains Support: Vote Could Come in July, WASH. POST, June 12, 1998, at
F3 (positing that creditors are seeking “greater powers to recoup what they are owed”).
144. Seelye, Senate to Curb Bankruptcy Abuse, supra note 126; see also Kathleen
Day, Bankruptcy Legislation Still Faces Hurdles, WASH. POST, May 5, 2000, at E2
[hereinafter Day, Bankruptcy Legislation Still Faces Hurdles] (“[A]fter three years of
trying—and spending more than $23.4 million in contributions . . . industry groups were
closer than ever to getting the bankruptcy bill they wanted enacted.”).
145. Morgan, Creditors’ Money, supra note 37 (noting the “wide spectrum of special
interests” backing the bill and saying the House Bill is “salted with language benefiting” a
variety of creditor types who have also lobbied heavily); see also Morgan & Day, supra
note 131 (claiming lawmakers “consulted closely with representatives” of key lobbyists
and creditor representatives).
146. Shenon, Measure Gains on a Lopsided Senate Vote, supra note 137.
147. Yochi J. Dreazen, Bankruptcy Reform Pits Industries Against Each Other, WALL
ST. J., Apr. 20, 2000, at A28 (“[I]n the back rooms of Capitol Hill, the nature of the fight
changes. Industry lobbyists, many ostensibly allied in favor of bankruptcy-overhaul
legislation, vie to carve out as many favors for their clients as possible at the expense of
other business groups.”).
148. Hamburger, Auto Firms See Profit in Bankruptcy-Reform, supra note 3
(claiming that the “long-sought bill . . . contains several other obscure provisions
that . . . provide special benefits to groups with the ability to influence decision makers”).
Cf. Mike McEneney, Remarks at the Meeting of the National Bankruptcy Review
Commission 202 (Dec. 17, 1996) (transcript on file with the Houston Law Review) (“We’ve
tried to convey that we are a unified industry. We’re trying to speak with one voice. We
find it to be a harmonious one, not a cacophony, for example, and if you hear any discord,
please let us know.”). But see Dreazen, supra note 147 (claiming that the facially unified
creditor’s lobby becomes increasingly fragmented behind the scenes); David Wessel, The
Muddled Course of Bankruptcy Law, WALL ST. J., Feb. 22, 2001, at A1 (explaining that
bankruptcy at its “loftiest level” is about balancing debtors’ fresh starts with creditor
fairness, but “at ground level, it’s about consumer lenders—car dealers, credit-card
issuers, furniture stores—jockeying for position to get what they can from families with
little money left”). See generally Posner, supra note 45, at 55–56 (explaining potential
conflicts among creditors in the creation of the 1978 Act).
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The quotes of sources opposed to the bill or critical of
portions of it often focused on the credit industry rather than
149
substantive bankruptcy issues. Critics called the bill the “‘best
150
bill money can buy,’” the “‘industry’s wish list,’” “‘of, by and for
151
the credit companies,’” and “‘written by a lot of people who have
152
very special interests to protect.’” They described the credit
industry as “big givers, heavy hitters, a huge and powerful
153
lobbying coalition” that wrote “large parts of the bill, paid for
questionable research to support their claims, hired some of the
best lobbyists in town and liberally stuffed the campaign coffers
154
Skeptics and opponents
of key members of both parties.”

149. See, e.g., Dreazen, supra note 147 (“‘This whole bill is a case of one industry
picking the pockets of another.’” (quoting Professor Warren)); Katharine Q. Seelye,
D’Amato Proposes Cut in Some Fees Charged to A.T.M. Users, N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 1998,
at A17 (“‘If you vote against it, you lose campaign contributions from the banks . . . . But if
you vote for it, you let your opponent point out to voters that you just socked it to
consumers.’” (quoting Professor Warren)); Seelye, House to Vote on Bankruptcy Overhaul,
supra note 139 (estimating that creditors “‘could easily see a billion a year in windfall
profits from this legislation . . . by squeezing hard-pressed families out of the bankruptcy
system and continuing to collect from them $50 here and $50 there’” (quoting Professor
Warren)); Seelye, Senate to Curb Bankruptcy Abuse, supra note 126 (“‘How can
democratically elected representatives vote to transfer wealth from financially troubled
families to corporate lenders who are making record profits?’” (quoting Professor
Warren)); Shenon, Hard Lobbying Pays Dividend, supra note 131 (“‘This bill is the credit
card industry’s wish list . . . . They’ve hired every lobbying firm in Washington. They’ve
decided that it’s time to lock the doors to the bankruptcy courthouse.’” (quoting Professor
Warren)).
150. Day, Bankruptcy Bill Goes to House Floor, supra note 126 (quoting Frank
Torres, a lobbyist for Consumers Union); Morgan & Day, supra note 131 (quoting Torres).
151. Jacob M. Schlesinger & Christina Duff, House Approves Big Bankruptcy-Code
Overhaul, WALL ST. J., June 11, 1998, at A2 (quoting Rep. Jerrold Nadler); Katharine Q.
Seelye, House Approves Legislation to Curb Laws on Bankruptcy, N.Y. TIMES, June 11,
1998, at A22 (interviewing Rep. Nadler, who emphasized the creditors’ central focus of
increasing debt recovery).
152. Schlesinger, As Bankruptcies Surge, supra note 3 (quoting Sen. Dick Durbin).
Although Sen. Durbin was an original sponsor of the Senate Bill, he sought to achieve a
balanced product and thus was critical of versions of the bill that restricted bankruptcy
relief as proposed by the credit industry without also addressing credit industry practices.
See e.g., Mayer, Negotiators Complete Bankruptcy Reform Bill, supra note 47 (indicating
that Sen. Durbin was “disturbed” by the Republican version of the bill that eliminated a
requirement for credit-card companies to provide a form of credit counseling to
consumers); Morgan, Creditors’ Money, supra note 37 (describing Sen. Durbin’s version of
the bill as “more friendly to borrowers”).
153. Shenon, Measure Gains on a Lopsided Senate Vote, supra note 137 (“[Industry
representatives] have way too much access, and they have way too much say. And I say
that this is an institutional problem, because the people who are trying to rebuild their
lives in bankruptcy, they don’t have clout, the same economic resources.” (quoting Sen.
Paul Wellstone)); see also Seelye, Senate to Curb Bankruptcy Abuse, supra note 126
(noting the overwhelming support for the bill in the Senate).
154. Morgan & Day, supra note 131 (quoting Travis Plunkett of the Consumer
Federation of America); see also Kathleen Day, Credit Counseling Agencies Dealt Setback:
Banks Reduce Funding as Bankruptcies Rise; Consumer Groups Hit Move, WASH. POST,
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described credit industry lobbying as “brazen,” particularly when
“their aggressive marketing and lending practices” push families
into financial trouble.155
Aside from the news reporting, the New York Times and
Washington Post editorial pages also strongly embraced this
156
industry power frame. They described the bill as “stuffed with
gifts to the credit card industry, which has gained leverage in
Congress
through
millions
of
dollars
in
campaign
157
contributions.” They found the support of both Republicans and
158
Democrats being lobbied, bought, and “generously paid” for: on
July 16, 1999, at E1 (quoting Plunkett as saying that the “‘credit card industry has spent
millions of dollars to scapegoat many working Americans’”); Day, House Passes
Bankruptcy Limits, supra note 4 (“‘This one-sided bill demonstrates the power of political
money over balanced public policy.’” (quoting Ed Mierzwinski of the U.S. Public Interest
Research group)); Day, Senate Votes to Toughen Bankruptcy, supra note 124 (“‘The cries,
claims and concerns of vulnerable Americans who have suffered a financial emergency
have been drowned out by the political might of the credit card industry.’” (quoting
Howard M. Metzenbaum, head of Consumer Federation of America); Id. (quoting Sen.
Patrick Leahy as saying the industry got “‘a heck of windfall and a lot more than they
deserve’”); Labaton, Promised Veto, supra note 60 (quoting John J. Sweeny, president of
AFL-CIO, as saying the “‘bill is a heartless attack on working families by powerful
financial institutions’”); Seelye, First Lady in a Messy Fight, supra note 4 (“‘It was a
combination of aggressive industry lobbying, by retailers as well as creditors, and they
spent a great deal . . . .’” (quoting Stephen Brobeck, executive director of Consumer
Federation of America)); Seelye, House to Vote on Bankruptcy Overhaul, supra note 139
(“‘It’s hard to find someone on K Street who hasn’t been called in to work on this bill.’”
(quoting Sen. Christopher Dodd)); Shenon, Hard Lobbying Pays Dividend, supra note 131
(reporting Sen. Leahy’s comment on credit industry influence over lawmakers’ support for
bill); Shenon, Senate Rejects Industry Curbs, supra note 124 (quoting Sen. Russell
Feingold accusing the credit industry of “‘shower[ing] senators and the political parties,
and it shows’”).
155. Day, Foes of Bankruptcy Bill, supra note 130 (quoting Travis Plunkett); Philip
Shenon, Senate Panel Approves Bill for Overhauling Bankruptcy Laws, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
1, 2001, at A15 (same); see also Associated Press, Legislation to Overhaul Laws on
Bankruptcy Dies as President Fails to Sign It, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 20, 2000, at A32
(reporting on Sen. Edward Kennedy’s views that the veto was appropriate and that the
bankruptcy bill was too harsh on innocent debtors); Associated Press, Resisting Credit
Cards’ Allure, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 2000, at BU11 (stating that consumer advocates
attribute a decline in filings to changes in lending and borrowing practices); Schmitt,
Higher Bar for Debtors, supra note 124 (referring to bill as “‘industry’s cure’” that was
“‘worse than the disease’” (quoting Sen. Kennedy)); Wessel, supra note 148 (emphasizing
industry practices by citing unnamed consumer advocates claiming that “creditors are too
quick to lend”). See generally SKEEL, JR., supra note 1, at 203 (noting that some debtor
advocates blamed lenders for bankruptcy boom).
156. The Wall Street Journal editorial board did not directly address bankruptcy
reform during the period of study.
157. Editorial, A Gift for the Credit Card Industry, N.Y. TIMES, May 30, 2000, at A22.
158. Editorial, A Business-Dictated Bankruptcy Law, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 16, 2001, at
A18 (classifying the bill as a reward for industry generosity to Republican candidates and
noting that “now credit card issuers want the government to reduce all risk from their
profitable business”); Editorial, A Retreat in the Senate, WASH. POST, Jan. 27, 2000, at
A26 (“The lending industry badly wants the bankruptcy bill. That’s the pressure to which
the Senate Democrats are yielding.”); Editorial, Bankrupt Bipartisanship, WASH. POST,
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account of “a modest investment—perhaps $20 million in
political contributions and another $5 million or so to grease the
palms of lobbyists—banks, credit-card companies and other
lenders are hoping for legislation that may squeeze $3 billion
159
extra from bankrupt debtors every year.” Authors of signed
opinion pieces, including David Broder, Floyd Norris, and Sen.
Russ Feingold, also framed discussions of bankruptcy in terms of
160
industry influence.
Anecdotal observation suggests parallels in other media
161
For example, Time magazine ran a major article,
outlets.
Dec. 15, 2000, at A40 [hereinafter Bankrupt Bipartisanship] (encouraging Senators to
back possible Clinton veto “however generous the contributions from the credit-card
industry”); Editorial, Loophole for Millionaires, WASH. POST, July 16, 2001, at A14
[hereinafter Loophole for Millionaires] (questioning whether conference committee could
make meaningful progress given Senators Daschle and Biden’s support for credit
industry); Editorial, Reform Choice for Mr. Bush, WASH. POST, Feb. 19, 2001, at A32
(predicting industry would remind lawmakers about contributions when they scrutinized
the bill).
159. Editorial, The Rich Win, WASH. POST, June 9, 2000, at A32.
160. David S. Broder, Business in the Driver’s Seat, WASH. POST, Mar. 14, 2001, at
A25 (“Banks and credit card companies have been pressing for the bankruptcy law
changes for five years, eager to stem their losses from people who accept the ‘easy credit’
these same companies market with 3 billion solicitations a year . . . .”); David S. Broder,
Morally Bankrupt Creditors, WASH. POST, May 16, 1999, at B7 (“[T]he banks that
dominate that business have been the most aggressive lobbyists for tightening the
bankruptcy law.”); Russ Feingold, Lobbyists’ Rush for Bankruptcy Reform, WASH. POST,
June 7, 1999, at A19 (characterizing bankruptcy legislation as the poster child for
campaign finance reform).
Powerful economic interests see an opportunity to push through major structural
changes to the bankruptcy system before the public becomes aware of the
consequences of what they are doing and works to stop them. And one reason
these interests can get Congress to act so quickly is that they have spent
millions on lobbying and campaign contributions.
Id.; Floyd Norris, Editorial, Bankruptcy Reform that Spares the Wealthy, N.Y. TIMES, May
9, 1999, at A16 [hereinafter Norris, Bankruptcy Reform that Spares the Wealthy]
(asserting that the “bill was pushed by the credit card companies”).
161. See Deeper in Debt, ECONOMIST, July 3, 1999, at 64, 64 (arguing that
profitability of risky lending “has not stopped the credit-card industry from lobbying
furiously” for bankruptcy reform and questioning if “anybody [can] stop the credit-card
companies [from] changing the rules after the game has [already] started”); Michele
Jacklin, Editorial, U.S. House Gives a Boost to Credit-Card Sharks, Editorial, HARTFORD
COURANT, June 23, 1999, at A15 (highlighting the favorable concessions that credit-card
companies would gain with the bill and the amount that the credit industry has
contributed to political campaigns); Christopher H. Schmitt, Tougher Bankruptcy Laws—
Compliments of MBNA?, BUS. WEEK, Feb. 26, 2001, at 43, 43 (describing MNBA’s efforts
to influence the Republican lawmakers); Paul Wiseman, Lenders Lobby for Reform of
Bankruptcy, USA TODAY, Oct. 21, 1997, at 6A; Joshua Wolf Shenk, Bankrupt Policy, THE
NEW REPUBLIC, May 18, 1998, at 16, 16–17 (examining credit industry profitability and
lobbying efforts); Robert Reno, Feeding Sharks, Starving Minnows, NEWSDAY, Sept. 27,
1998 (commenting that “rarely does the U.S. Senate disgrace itself with such perfect
symmetry,” suggesting that lenders’ success with bankruptcy reform was accomplished by
“pour[ing] $17 million into the last congressional elections,” and asserting that lenders
“are getting full value for their money”).
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Soaked by Congress: Lavished with Campaign Cash, Lawmakers
Are “Reforming” Bankruptcy—Punishing the Downtrodden to
Catch a Few Cheats,162 which was rumored to have affected the
political
future
of
bankruptcy
during
the
Clinton
163
Administration.
1. Controversy? The industry influence frame was perhaps
the most ubiquitous and the least effective of those explored in
this Article. Framing the bankruptcy debate in terms of credit
industry power arguably enabled a broader group of people,
including consumer advocates and some lawmakers, to speak
164
critically about the bill without deep expertise in bankruptcy. It
also was an integral part of an attempt to make the omnibus
165
bankruptcy bill a “poster child” for campaign finance reform.
There is, however, little evidence that lawmakers embraced this
166
link in large numbers. Given the ubiquity of special interests in
federal lawmaking, the fact of credit industry support hardly
167
could itself be a substantial roadblock to legislation.

162. Donald L. Barlett & James B. Steele, Soaked by Congress: Lavished with
Campaign Cash, Lawmakers Are “Reforming” Bankruptcy—Punishing the Downtrodden
to Catch a Few Cheats, TIME, May 15, 2000, at 64; Charles Jordan Tabb, The Death of
Consumer Bankruptcy in the United States?, 18 BANKR. DEV. J. 1, 47–48 (2001) (noting
this type of general press coverage, including prominent Time magazine article).
163. Interview with Brady Williamson (Oct. 24, 2002) (reporting that Sen. Ted
Kennedy hand-delivered “Soaked by Congress” to President Clinton).
164. Refer to notes 150–55 supra and accompanying text.
165. Editorial, A Bankrupt Proposal, S.F. CHRON., July 25, 2001, at A18 (describing
the bankruptcy bill as a “special-interest bonanza” helping to justify campaign finance
reform); Feingold, supra note 160 (citing bankruptcy legislation as the poster child for
campaign finance reform). But see William F. Buckley, Jr., Buy Now, Pay Never: What
About the Excesses of the Appetites of the Borrower?, at http://www.nationalreview.com/
buckley/buckleyprint031301.html (Mar. 13, 2001) (criticizing media focus on lobbying and
contributions); National Review Staff, Journalistically Bankrupt: How Else to Describe
One Network’s Coverage of New Bankruptcy Legislation?, at http://www.nationalreview.
com/nr_comment/nr_commentprint031601c.html (Mar. 16, 2001) (criticizing reporters for
focusing on lobbying and contributions rather than substantive merits of legislation);
Todd J. Zywicki, The Problem With Using Bankruptcy as a Tool in the Campaign Finance
Reform Crusade, American Bankruptcy Institute, at http://www.abiworld.org/Temp
late.cfm?Section=Archives3&CONTENTID=7470&TEMPLATE=/ContentManagement/Co
ntentDisplay.cfm (May 22, 2000) (arguing that the media was treating the bill “as a pawn
in its larger agenda of advancing the case for campaign finance reform”).
166. One indication that the issues were never successfully linked is that Sen. John
McCain and Rep. Shays—two main sponsors of campaign finance reform bills—voted in
favor of the bankruptcy bill. See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1998, H.R. 3150, House Roll
Call Vote #506, 105th Cong. (Oct. 9, 1998), http://clerk.house.gov/evs/1998/roll506.xml;
Motion to Proceed to Consider Conference Report on H.R. 3150, H.R. 3150, Senate Roll
Call Vote #313, 105th Cong. (Oct. 9, 1998), http://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_
call_lists/roll_call_vote_cfm.cfm?congress=105&session=2&vote=00313.
167. Nonetheless, this frame also affected bankruptcy reporting in the early 1980s.
See, e.g., Jacoby, supra note 78, at 229 n.47 (listing examples).
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Lawmakers become defensive at the notion that they support
bankruptcy legislation simply because of industry support and
lobbying.168 The “controversy” value of this frame is thus arguably
limited.
2. Improvement? To the extent that allegations of special
interest fail to create substantial controversy, one should not
expect this frame to coincide with or encourage specific changes
to legislation. Although Senate Democrats sought to increase
credit industry accountability throughout 1998 and may have
found some encouragement to do so in the media, Congress
watered down and deleted those very provisions even as the
press continued to characterize the bill as a gift to the credit
169
industry. Lawmakers did remove or modify some provisions
that especially strengthened the collection rights of the credit
170
industry, but these changes more likely were connected to
framing bankruptcy in terms of women and children, discussed
171
later.
3. Educational Value? An evaluation of mediaestablishment influence is more complete if one also asks
whether a particular frame advanced readers’ understanding of
the substantive law and proposals to change it, which ultimately
may affect the political viability of future legislative
developments. The reporting implicitly told readers that the
consumer credit industry has a lot at stake in the bankruptcy
172
system. This is an important and relevant message, but the
educational value may stop there. Campaign contribution

168. One finds examples in the letters lawmakers wrote in response to articles and
editorials employing the industry influence frame. See, e.g., Sen. Joseph R. Biden Jr. (DDel.), Letter to the Editor, “Loopholes for Millionaires”, WASH. POST, July 19, 2001, at A26
(clarifying his voting record and denying alleged support for the credit industry); Sen.
Charles Grassley (R-Iowa) & Sen. Robert Torricelli (D-N.J.), Letter to the Editor,
Bankruptcy Loopholes, WASH. POST, Feb. 15, 2000, at A22 (denouncing allegations that
the bankruptcy reform bill favored creditors).
169. The version of Senate Bill 1301 passed by the Senate in the 105th Congress
addressed credit industry accountability by further regulating credit-cards, dual use debit
cards, and home equity loans and lines of credit. See S. 1301, 105th Cong. (1997); refer
also to note 41 supra. The bill’s managers diluted or eliminated these provisions through
managers’ amendments, conference reports, and reintroduced versions of the bill rather
than discrete amendments. See, e.g., S. Amends. 3540–3617, 144 CONG. REC. S9942–
10,728, S10,843–44 (1998).
170. Refer to note 237 infra and accompanying text.
171. Refer to Part III.C infra (attributing the weakening of provisions favoring the
credit industry to amendments packaged as helping women and children).
172. Refer to notes 128–29 supra and accompanying text.
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statistics and K Street lobbying gossip teach readers little about
the omnibus bankruptcy bill and how it might affect their lives.173
Many versions of the omnibus bankruptcy bill had around
280 provisions with multiple parts, and spanned well over 500
174
Its provisions would change the rules for the
pages.
reorganization of large and small enterprises, municipalities,
family farmers, family fisheries, and individuals in Chapter 11;
add an entire new Chapter to the Bankruptcy Code to deal with
transnational insolvency; regulate lawyers and their
conversations with debtor clients; impose a variety of new
obligations on the court system and the United States trustee
system; and substantially complicate the consumer bankruptcy
175
system for all filers. Stories framed in terms of the credit
176
industry do not invite discussion of these important issues.

173. Cf. JAMIESON & WALDMAN, supra note 7, at 168 (noting that election coverage
focuses on the “horse race,” rather than the issues); SCHUDSON, supra note 80, at 52
(noting the media’s preference for politics over policy and strategy and tactics over ideas);
W. Lance Bennett, Cracking the News Code: Some Rules that Journalists Live By, in DO
THE MEDIA GOVERN?, supra note 7, at 103, 105 (describing the “horse race plot” of
elections); Stuart W. Nolan, Jr., Campaign Finance Reform: Applying the First
Amendment in a Marketplace of Ideas, 6 J. COMM. L. & POL’Y 113, 113 (1998) (noting that
the media have traditionally “focused on the role of money in politics”); Joseph M.
Schwartz, Democracy Against the Free Market: The Enron Crisis and the Politics of Global
Deregulation, 35 CONN. L. REV. 1097, 1097 (2003) (stating that the “mainstream media
frames the Enron and subsequent corporate scandals as a story of political insider
trading: Bush’s Texas buddies using political connections to garner (de)regulatory breaks
and manipulate energy prices” and discounting this frame as only part of the story);
Shaviro, supra note 7, at 96–97 (describing how media coverage focuses on “horse races”
rather than ideas); Howard Kurtz, Reading Green Between the Lines, WASH. POST, Apr. 2,
2001, at C1 (highlighting the industry money reporting theme in bankruptcy and
elsewhere).
174. See, e.g., Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1999, H.R. 833, 106th Cong (1999).
175. See, e.g., Bankruptcy Reform Act of 2000, H.R. 833, 106th Cong., tits. III–V, VIII
(2000).
176. The means test was the main substantive provision that reporters covered, and
even this was not reported in significant detail. See, e.g., Pae & Stoughton, supra note 125
(“Among the proposals being debated in Congress is a ‘means test’ that is intended to
move some filers from a Chapter 7 bankruptcy filing to a Chapter 11 filing, which
requires a repayment plan.”). Three major newspapers published at least one story on the
existence of business bankruptcy provisions, but did not delve into the changes that
needed exposure and discussion. See Bankruptcy Media Database (on file with Author).
Reporters sometimes focused on proposed amendments that were newsworthy but were
not Bankruptcy Code amendments, such as minimum wage, limiting ATM fees,
restricting Lloyds of London from suing U.S. investors in U.S. courts, application of the
Fair Debt Collection Practices Act to bounced checks, and consumer credit regulation and
disclosure. Id. The press also tended to discuss provisions addressing narrow but
independently newsworthy categories of hypothetical or actual bankruptcy filers, such as
gun manufacturers, recording artists and other celebrities, and, particularly, abortion
protestors. Id.; see also John F. Witt, Narrating Bankruptcy/Narrating Risk, 98 NW. U. L.
REV. 303, 311 (2003) (book review) (discussing how bankruptcy debates today occur “by
proxy” with only remote relationship to bankruptcy itself).

1128

HOUSTON LAW REVIEW

[41:4

This frame also leaves little room for more than
oversimplified statements of current law. As just one important
example, the media tended to draw an overly stark distinction
between the two basic consumer bankruptcy options—Chapter 7
and Chapter 13—in terms of debtor-friendliness and creditor
177
treatment. Framing bankruptcy as an industry influence story
178
was prevalent and not very surprising, but had questionable
utility.
B. Loopholes for the Rich
Reporters and commentators in the New York Times and the
Washington Post sometimes framed bankruptcy in terms of
“loopholes for the rich,” suggesting that proponents of the bill
preserved liberal bankruptcy policies for rich people but
179
Although bill
restricted relief for lower income filers.
proponents similarly framed some discussions to justify support
180
for the bill, their efforts seem less influential in shaping the

177. See Melissa B. Jacoby, Collecting Debts from the Ill and Injured: The Rhetorical
Significance, but Practical Irrelevance, of Culpability and Ability to Pay, 51 AM. U. L. REV.
229, 258–62 (2001) (explaining that arguments favoring legislation relied on inaccurate
distinctions between types of bankruptcy).
178. See Nourse & Schacter, supra note 30, at 587–88 (highlighting the Senate
staffers’ reporting of the ubiquitous role of lobbyists in the drafting process, with a cadre
of lawyers at the ready); Stephen Nunez & Howard Rosenthal, Bankruptcy “Reform” in
Congress: Creditors, Committees, Ideology, and Floor Voting in the Legislative Process, 20
J.L. ECON. & ORG. 527, 528, 552–54 (2004) (finding that House voting on bankruptcy
“strongly reflect[ed] campaign contributions”), http://www.jleo.oupjournals.org/cgi/reprint/
20/2/527; cf. Thomas Stratmann, Can Special Interests Buy Congressional Votes? Evidence
from Financial Services Legislation, 45 J.L. & ECON. 345, 368 (2002) (“The results in this
paper support the hypothesis that interest groups ‘buy’ legislators’ votes with PAC
contributions. The findings show that contributions are most effective in swinging the
vote of more junior legislators.”).
179. For examples outside the bankruptcy context, see, e.g., David Cay Johnston,
I.R.S. More Likely to Audit the Poor and Not the Rich, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 16, 2000, § 1, at 1
(highlighting the shift in auditing rates to focus on the poor); David Cay Johnston,
Reducing Audits of the Wealthy, I.R.S. Turns Eye on Working Poor, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15,
1999, at A1 (same); see also David Cay Johnston, Gap Between Rich and Poor Found
Substantially Wider, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 5, 1999, at 16.
180. See Day, Foes of Bankruptcy Bill, supra note 130 (citing a creditor
representative as saying he was “dumbfounded that a group that purports to be concerned
about low- and moderate-income people would be opposing legislation designed to force
wealthy people who can afford to pay some of their debts to do so rather than sticking
lower and moderate-income people with their tab”); Day, Senate Votes to Toughen
Bankruptcy, supra note 124 (“Wealthier filers walk away from billions of dollars in debt
each year, regardless of their ability to pay, . . . [which is] not fair to the 96 percent of
Americans who pay their bills on time.” (quoting Edward Yingling of the American
Bankers Assocation)); Stephen Labaton, House Votes to Make It Tougher to Escape Debt
Through Personal Bankruptcy, N.Y. TIMES, May 6, 1999, at A28 (“‘The more we’re able to
recoup some debt from high-income people, the less burden we will put on everyone
else . . . .’” (quoting Rep. Gekas)); Seelye, Republicans Agree to New Limits, supra note 47
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reporting, at least in this particular sample.181 Bill proponents’
reluctance to cap state homestead exemptions, “‘the single
biggest scandal in the consumer bankruptcy system,’” became the
182
principle vehicle for this frame.
A bit of background may be useful here. Property
exemptions establish the types of property an individual debtor
must forfeit or keep in Chapter 7 and help determine the
minimum amount an individual debtor must repay to creditors in
183
Chapters 13 or 11. Each state has its own set of property
184
exemptions that applies in bankruptcy. States such as Florida,
Texas, South Dakota, Iowa, and Kansas permit debtors to
185
exempt very high value homesteads. Thus, it is technically
possible that a bankruptcy filer could keep a multi-million dollar
186
home and make little or no payment to creditors. The omnibus

(“‘Consumers across the country who work hard and pay their own way should not be
forced to subsidize the abusive spending practices of those who exploit the Federal
bankruptcy code for personal gain or convenience . . . .’” (quoting Sen. Grassley)); Shenon,
Bill Would Add Hurdles to Erasing of Debt, supra note 124 (quoting professor saying that
there is “no good reason why a schoolteacher earning $30,000 a year should have to pay
more for a mortgage or more for a new couch because some guy making $100,000 a year
finds it inconvenient to pay his debts”); Shenon, Measure Gains on a Lopsided Senate
Vote, supra note 137 (“‘This bill will do an awful lot of good for people in our society.’”
(quoting Sen. Hatch)). Burt Reynolds was supposed to be the “poster child” for bankruptcy
reform, see, e.g., 144 CONG. REC. E88 (1998) (statement of Rep. Gekas), not the poster
child for killing bankruptcy reform.
181. Cf. Witt, supra note 176, at 313.
[C]ritics of the [1800 Bankruptcy] Act began pointing out that the Act effectively
granted fresh starts to formerly wealthy merchants but not to the artisans and
farmers who were increasingly drawn into commercial relations but were
excluded from the Act’s coverage. Even worse, the fresh start for the merchant
might cancel debts owed to the farmer or artisan mechanic.
Id.
182. David J. Morrow, Key to a Cozier Bankruptcy: Location, Location, Location, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 7, 1998, at A1 (quoting Elizabeth Warren) [hereinafter Morrow, Cozier
Bankruptcy]; Floyd Norris, The New Bankruptcy Reform: Make the Rich Plan Ahead, N.Y.
TIMES, June 2, 2000, at C1 (quoting opponent saying bill just tells wealthy debtors how to
protect their assets). For a similar theme in an earlier piece, see Amy Stevens, Some
Folks Hide Cash in the Darnedest Places, WALL ST. J., Nov. 8, 1996, at B1 (reporting on
the generous exemptions in various states and the National Bankruptcy Reform
Commission’s interest in capping them).
183. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 552, 1129(a)(7), 1325(a)(4) (2000) (providing for exemptions for
individual debtors and requiring that creditors in repayment plans receive at least as
much as they would have received from the liquidation of nonexempt assets).
184. See CHARLES JORDAN TABB, THE LAW OF BANKRUPTCY 640–45 (1997). States are,
however, permitted to prevent their citizens from choosing the Federal Bankruptcy Code
exemptions as an alternative. 11 U.S.C. § 522 (b)(1).
185. See generally Lawrence Ponoroff, Exemption Limitations: A Tale of Two
Solutions, 71 AM. BANKR. L.J. 221 (1997) (reviewing diversity of state property
exemptions).
186. Bankruptcy law contains other policing mechanisms that can be used to curb
particularly egregious behavior along these lines, particularly if a debtor invested
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bankruptcy bill did not itself create this situation; this is a
problem of current (and longstanding) law.187 Yet the news
reporting suggested that proponents of the bill were at fault for
tolerating and preserving a loophole for the rich.
A big front page New York Times article in early January
1998 focused intensively on generous or unlimited homestead
188
A journalist
exemptions for wealthy bankruptcy filers.
reporting on a General Accounting Office study of exemption
usage noted that the “unlimited homestead exemption isn’t the
populist shield it has often been cracked up to be, but rather a
189
Articles
convenient protection for a few affluent people.”
attributed the failure to end what “is perhaps the most notorious
abuse of the [bankruptcy] system in some states” to the omnibus
190
bill and its supporters. The “high political symbolism” did not
191
go unnoticed. News reports suggested that President Clinton
supported capping exemptions to prevent differential rich-poor
192
treatment. By contrast, the press reported that then Governor
and later President George W. Bush, and legislators who

nonexempt assets in an exempt home on the eve of bankruptcy. See, e.g., TABB, supra note
184, at 651–55.
187. See Posner, supra note 45, at 94–96 (discussing the conflict between federal and
state exemption laws); see also BRUCE H. MANN, REPUBLIC OF DEBTORS: BANKRUPTCY IN
THE AGE OF AMERICAN INDEPENDENCE 197 (2002) (discussing concerns of Jeffersonians
that federal bankruptcy law would override local real property exemptions). The bill did,
however, include amendments that would permit a landlord to evict a bankruptcy filer
without seeking permission from the bankruptcy court first, thus making bankruptcy
harder on low-income renters than on those who owned expensive homes. See, e.g.,
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 2000, H.R. 833, 106th Cong. § 305(2)(B) (2000).
188. Morrow, Cozier Bankruptcy, supra note 182.
189. Dan Morgan, GAO: “Homestead Exemption” Aids Well-Off Few: Bush, Texas
Officials on Record as Opposing Move to Limit Bankruptcy Shelter, WASH. POST, July 18,
1999, at A6 [hereinafter Morgan, Homestead Exemption] (reporting on a General
Accounting Office study that analyzed approximately 30,000 bankruptcy cases in Texas
and Florida).
190. Shenon, Bill Would Add Hurdles to Erasing of Debt, supra note 124 (pointing
out the bankruptcy loophole created by state homestead exemption laws).
191. Morgan, Homestead Exemption, supra note 189; see also Day, Senate Votes to
Toughen Bankruptcy, supra note 124 (describing the difference between the House and
Senate’s treatment of the homestead exemption and noting that the debate was sparked
by bankruptcies of well-known people such as Burt Reynolds); Shenon, Bill to Tighten
Bankruptcy Gets a Push, supra note 140 (noting the conflict between House and Senate
versions of the bill).
192. See, e.g., Labaton, Promised Veto, supra note 60 (citing a letter from White
House Chief of Staff John Podesta to House leaders warning that the proposed
bankruptcy bill fails to eliminate homestead exemptions); Mayer, Negotiators Complete
Bankruptcy Reform Bill, supra note 47 (noting that the White House was concerned over
the bill’s lack of “fairness”); see also Schmidt, supra note 131 (noting that some Democrats
were angry with Sen. Torricelli for supporting a bill that cracks down on the poor but not
the rich).
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otherwise supported restricting bankruptcy relief, opposed
correction of this disparity.193
Once the New York Times and the Washington Post editorial
pages began their series of editorials on bankruptcy, they
regularly framed discussions of bankruptcy in terms of
preferential treatment and loopholes for the rich with a focus on
194
property exemptions. In Bad Bankruptcy Legislation, the New
York Times proclaimed it could not support the House Bill—a
“parody of reform”—because the bill inflexibly “cracks down” on
ordinary debtors but does “next to nothing” about the
195
bankruptcies of Burt Reynolds and Bowie Kuhn. In Protecting
Rich Bankrupts, the New York Times complained that the
pending legislation
would do nothing to limit the ways that the formerly
wealthy have of stiffing creditors, of which the unlimited
homestead exemption is only the best known. But the bill
would be a boon to the credit card companies, which have
pushed hard to get it enacted. . . .
The bill deserves to be defeated, but if it is to be
passed, it should at least be amended to keep Texas and
Florida from providing such blatant protection to once
196
wealthy deadbeats.

The New York Times distinguished the bill’s gentle
treatment of the “well heeled” from its harsh treatment of
197
“unsophisticated debtors.” While a potential Clinton veto was
looming, the New York Times editorial desk lamented the bill’s

193. See, e.g., Morgan, Homestead Exemption, supra note 189 (noting that President
Bush is solidly against changing the homestead exemption); Philip Shenon, Home
Exemptions Snag Bankruptcy Bill, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 6, 2001, at A1 (stating that President
Bush was a “passionate defender of the unlimited homestead exemption when he was
governor of Texas”).
194. Cf. Shaviro, supra note 7, at 11 & n.33 (noting the consistent concern about
“loopholes” in the income tax system from inception through the 1970s). Although Shaviro
notes that the term “loopholes” is out of fashion in tax policy because it connotes an
unintended rather than intended benefit, the term seemingly remains vibrant in
bankruptcy policy discussions. Id. at 11 n.33.
195. Editorial, Bad Bankruptcy Legislation, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 10, 1998, at A14 (“A
fair bill would attack the real abuses, while giving judges flexibility to consider the
circumstances of debtors. This bill does neither. If it reaches his desk, President Clinton
should veto it.”).
196. Editorial, Protecting Rich Bankrupts, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13, 1999, at A20 (noting
that the Texas Legislature had been seeking to expand the acreage of the homestead
exemption).
197. Editorial, A Gift for the Credit Card Industry, N.Y. TIMES, May 30, 2000, at A22
(highlighting that the bill allows wealth debtors to lock away millions in trust, while
making those on modest incomes combine paying off credit-cards with paying for child
care).
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protection of those with “mansions, trust funds and pension
accounts.”198
Likewise, the Washington Post expressed concern about the
199
bill’s failure to cap homestead exemptions and called this an
“egregious loophole”: “Ordinarily, a proposal to tighten the
screws on average families while allowing millionaires a loophole
would attract some robust criticism. But the White House and
200
The “egregious
congressional Democrats are oddly quiet.”
homestead exemption,” the Washington Post explained, “allows
millionaires to keep the full value of a house they have owned for
two years out of reach of creditors . . . . With a bit of planning,
201
therefore, movie stars can still escape their creditors.” The
Washington Post applauded President Clinton’s pocket veto “for
the good reason that it was too tough on ordinary debtors . . . and
202
too generous to high-rollers with fancy tax accountants,” and it
scolded Sen. Biden for supporting the bill “despite its inclusion of
a loophole allowing millionaires to shield mansions from their
203
creditors.” Signed opinion pieces expressed similar concerns
204
about unequal restrictions.
The reporting only occasionally applied the “loopholes for the
rich” frame to other issues, which were far from central to the
bankruptcy bill. For example, the bill briefly contained a
controversial provision shielding investors from suit by Lloyds of
198. Editorial, An Unfair Bankruptcy Bill, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 2000, at A34.
199. Editorial, Bad Ideas on Bankruptcy, WASH. POST, Feb. 18, 2000, at A22.
200. Editorial, The Rich Win, WASH. POST, June 9, 2000, at A32.
201. Bankrupt Bipartisanship, supra note 158.
202. Editorial, Reform Choice for Mr. Bush, WASH. POST, Feb. 19, 2001, at A32.
203. Loophole for Millionaires, supra note 158 (commending Sen. Leahy for wanting
to restrict homestead exemptions and require more credit-card disclosures, even though
the outcome would depend on Sen. Biden’s support).
204. See, e.g., David S. Broder, Business in the Driver’s Seat, WASH. POST, Mar. 14,
2001, at A25 (stating that legislation would “squeeze money” from those “clobbered by job
losses, divorce or medical disasters, yet allow some millionaires to plead bankruptcy while
turning their assets into mansions in states with unlimited homestead exemptions”);
Norris, Bankruptcy Reform that Spares the Wealthy, supra note 160 (noting that the
House Bill would not change entitlements of Burt Reynolds and Bowie Kuhn to keep
expensive homes, but would “make life harder for poor and middle-class people,” and that
taxpayers “will foot the bill to force people to pay their debts” unless those people are rich
enough to shield their assets in valuable Texas or Florida homes); Floyd Norris, In
Florida, Fraud Doesn’t Matter. Will Congress Object?, N.Y. TIMES, July 6, 2001, at C1 (“So
Congress will crack down on struggling families that do not plan bankruptcies well. The
question is whether it will close the loophole that allows some people to live in luxury
while stiffing their creditors.”). Even Fred Hiatt, who was guarded in his support of either
“side” of the bankruptcy debate, found after interviewing bankruptcy experts that it was
“worth noting that the House refused to close the biggest loophole for the wealthy—a
provision in some state laws that allows those entering bankruptcy to shield their assets
in million-dollar mansions.” Fred Hiatt, Credit Due vs. Undue Credit, WASH. POST, June
14, 1998, at C7.
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London, which a front page story in the Washington Post
characterized as an additional protection for millionaires.205
1. Controversy? Exemptions have long been controversial,
206
as suggested earlier, and were again here. The news media did
not itself create the controversy, but arguably reinforced it and
kept pressure on lawmakers to seek a federal limit on state
homestead exemptions—inevitably to be strenuously opposed by
colleagues fighting for states’ rights—when proponents of
limiting exceptions otherwise might have quietly retreated.
Lawmakers dedicated multiple rounds of amendments to the
homestead exemption in several congresses: One lawmaker
would try to insert a homestead exemption limitation while
another would try to remove the limitation or add an opt-out
provision to address state rights and state constitutional
207
concerns. At least one lawmaker would have tried to kill the
bill on the basis of a homestead exemption cap, and others
208
President Clinton allegedly
wholeheartedly opposed a cap.
205. Kathleen Day, Bankruptcy Bill Benefits Chosen Few: Well-to-Do Investors
Sought Special Provision, WASH. POST, Mar. 10, 2001, at A1.
206. Refer to note 187 supra and accompanying text (discussing the property
exemption controversy). Some members of Congress presumably were interested in this
issue before the media so actively framed the omnibus bankruptcy bill in these terms. For
example, in the mid-1990s, Sen. Herb Kohl proposed freestanding legislation to cap state
homestead exemptions for bankruptcy purposes. See Bankruptcy Abuse Reform Act of
1995, S. 769, 104th Cong. § 2 (1995). As noted in the text, however, the media may have
had a role in encouraging these lawmakers to continue the fight on this issue.
207. For examples of amendments, see S. Amend. 68 to S.420, 107th Cong. (2001)
(limiting the value of property debtors may exempt under state or local law); S. Amend.
2778 to S.625, 106th Cong. (1999) (same); H. Amend. 54 to H.R. 833, 106th Cong. (1999)
(allowing states to opt out of the homestead exemption); S. Amend. 2516 to S. 625, 106th
Cong. (1999) (limiting the value of property debtors may exempt under state or local law);
S. Amend. 3599 to S. 1301, 105th Cong. (1998) (expressing the Senate’s sense of misuse
regarding the homestead exemption); H. Amend. 666 to H.R. 3150, 105th Cong. (1998)
(striking the $100,000 homestead exemption cap); H. Amend. 665 to H.R. 3150, 105th
Cong. (1998) (proposing to reorder the priority of governments when funds are disbursed);
H. Amend. 660 to H.R. 3150, 105th Cong. (1998) (limiting the amount of a debtor’s
homestead).
208. See, e.g., 145 CONG. REC. S14,481 (1999) (statement of Sen. Hutchison arguing
that states should be able to opt out of any exemption cap); Tom Hamburger, Senate
Approves Bankruptcy Legislation Provision Capping Exemption on Home Equity May
Lead to Battle with Bush, House, WALL ST. J., Mar. 16, 2001, at A3 (quoting Sen. Kay
Bailey Hutchison as vowing to “‘do everything I can to fix this in conference . . . or
unfortunately I am going to have to try and kill the bill’” (alteration in original)); Press
Release, Bankruptcy Bill Violates States’ Rights, at http://brownback.senate.gov/pressapp/
record.cfm?id=175597& (Mar. 23, 2001) (reporting Sen. Brownback’s opposition to a bill
containing a homestead exemption cap); Press Release, Senator Hutchison Vows
Continued Effort to Preserve Texas’ Homestead Exemption: Will Work with Conference
on Final Bankruptcy Legislation, at http://hutchison.senate.gov/prl201.htm (Feb. 2, 2000)
(“It is wrong to pre-empt 130 years of American history—and the rights of every state—to
go after a handful of bad actors. This is the classic government attempt to impose a one-
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based his pocket veto, in part, on the lack of a cap.209 This issue
was significant enough to be described by political scientists as
210
Because lawmakers developed a
having “killer properties.”
compromise, however, the controversy of the frame was not as
enduring as some opponents to the bill may have hoped.
2. Improvement of Legislation? As just noted, lawmakers
211
compromised in a manner that is not necessarily helpful. Had
the media and experts used this frame to discuss other aspects of
212
the omnibus bill, improvements might have been possible.
Absent a focus on these other issues, however, the homestead
exemption compromise limited the improvement possibilities.
3. Educational Value? The “loopholes for the rich” frame as
applied to the homestead exemption may have taught readers the
accurate lesson that state law fundamentally controls some of the
perceived benefits of bankruptcy unless bankruptcy overrides
that state law. On the other hand, the “loopholes for the rich”
story principally relied on highlighting famous people with ample
213
assets to satisfy creditors’ claims. Researchers have unearthed
size-fits-all solution.”).
209. See Memorandum of Disapproval for Bankruptcy Reform Legislation, 3 PUB.
PAPERS 2730, 2730–31 (Dec. 19, 2000) (opposing the bill because of the “glaring omission
of a real homestead cap”).
210. See, e.g., Nunez & Rosenthal, supra note 178, at 1–2 (finding that in the Senate,
“state interests in homestead exemptions influenced voting” and that the homestead issue
“had killer properties”).
211. H.R. 975, 108th Cong. §§ 307, 308, 322 (2003) (imposing a new fraudulent
conveyance scheme, limiting exemptions claimed on property acquired within 1215 days
of filing, and increasing domicile requirements for claiming state exemptions); see also
147 CONG. REC. S2334–35 (2001) (letter from ninety-one law professors) (criticizing
earlier compromise proposals that fell short of a firm cap on exemptions).
212. Two examples from the means test are illustrative. First, the means test
partially relies on IRS guidelines to determine expenses of bankrupt households, but the
IRS guidelines let richer families spend more money. See, e.g., H.R. 975 § 102. Thus, the
default expense rules in the means test would let a high-income household of one spend
more on food than a low-income family of four. See I.R.S. Publication 1854 (Rev. 8-2004)
(setting the national standards for calculating food, clothing, and miscellaneous other
expenses for the purpose of completing I.R.S. Form 433-A), available at http://www.
irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p1854.pdf (providing a $976 monthly food, clothing, and miscellaneous
allowance for an individual with a monthly income of $5834 or more, but providing $859
monthly food, clothing, and miscellaneous allowance for a family of four with a monthly
income of less than $833). In addition, the means test does not apply to debtors unless
they have primarily consumer debts, and thus high-income individuals with large
business-related debts who file Chapter 7 would not be means tested. See, e.g., Douglas
Baird, Editorial, Bankruptcy Bill Would Prevent Some from Making a Fresh Start, CHI.
TRIB., June 25, 1999, § 1, at 21 (explaining different outcomes for a high-income
businessperson and a lower income widow with medical debts).
213. See, e.g., Bad Bankruptcy Legislation, supra note 195 (criticizing bankruptcy
legislation for allowing wealthy filers such as Burt Reynolds to remain millionaires after
filing for personal bankruptcy).
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very few rich and famous bankruptcy filers.214 A disproportionate
focus on this group could breed further distrust about the
bankruptcy system and its users, the vast majority of whom, by
most empirical accounts, are of quite modest means.
Notwithstanding concerns about overemphasizing wealthy
filers, readers might have been educated by a discussion of
provisions included in the omnibus bankruptcy bill that preferred
215
Those
well-off, or at least well advised, bankruptcy filers.
examples did not receive coverage, either because sources
refrained from discussing them with reporters, or because
reporters focused on more easily digestible issues. Many
reporters do not believe that their job description includes
216
thoroughly analyzing complex legal problems. Bankruptcy is
217
not its own newsbeat. Journalists’ capacity for copious details is
214. For example, the GAO studied exemption usage in districts in Florida and
Texas. The GAO found average homestead exemption claims of about $15,000 and median
claims of $9000 in these districts for homestead exemptions of less than $100,000. The
average and median exemption claims among those exceeding $100,000 (only one percent
of the sample) hovered around $148,000 in Texas and $120,000 in Florida. GEN.
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PUB. NO. GAO/GGD-99-118R, BANKRUPTCY REFORM: USE OF THE
HOMESTEAD EXEMPTION BY CHAPTER 7 BANKRUPTCY DEBTORS IN THE NORTHERN DISTRICT
OF TEXAS AND THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA IN 1998, at 1–3 (1999), http://www.gao
.gov/archive/1999/gg99118r.pdf; TODD J. ZYWICKI, WHY SO MANY BANKRUPTCIES AND
WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY LAW AND
BANKRUPTCY REFORM 102 (George Mason Univ. Sch. of Law, Law & Econ. Working Paper
Series No. 03-46, 2003) (finding that a cap on “homestead exemptions would have little
effect on the bankruptcy filing rate”), http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=454121. For a list of
“people with valuable personas who have filed for bankruptcy,” see Melissa B. Jacoby &
Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Foreclosing on Fame: Exploring the Uncharted Boundaries
of the Right of Publicity, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1322, 1325–26 (2002).
215. Refer to note 212 supra (describing a scenario in which a high-income individual
would receive a larger personal expense allowance than low-income family of four).
216. For example, according to one study in the early 1990s, a significant majority of
journalists attributed extreme importance to providing quick information, while less than
half thought “providing analysis of complex problems” was extremely important. David H.
Weaver & G. Cleveland Wilhoit, The American Journalist in the 1990s, in DO THE MEDIA
GOVERN?, supra note 7, at 18, 25. See generally Trudy Lieberman, The Media and
Government Regulation, 11 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 547, 550, 552–53 (2002) (noting that
journalists shy away from detailed regulation as “too much inside baseball” and report
underinclusively on legislation: “The law does not do a lot of things the press said it
would, and it does others that the press entirely missed”); Walsh, supra note 83, at 9
(conceding that reporters’ “need for brevity will inevitably lead to articles that
oversimplify”).
217. See WILLIS, supra note 10, at 103, 140 (advocating greater business
specialization, technical knowledge and experience, and engagement in research and
describing some newsbeats as “career stoppers”); W. Lance Bennett, Cracking the News
Code: Some Rules that Journalists Live By, in DO THE MEDIA GOVERN?, supra note 7, at
103, 105 (stating that journalists decide which issues to cover based on the degree of
public pronouncement and opposition to the issues); Lieberman, supra note 216, at 548
(expressing that “reporters now avoid dull and complicated beats and stories” such as
government) see also Goldstein, supra note 83, at 899 (quoting the Wall Street Journal
managing editor as saying, “Law is ‘core, core, core’ to business,” but recognizing that the
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likely sated by the breadth of subjects they cover.218 Short
219
deadlines also may limit their tolerance for complexity. As a
consequence, the educational potential of the “loopholes for the
rich” frame likely was diminished.
C. Women and Children
Far removed from the once-dominant theme of debtor
irresponsibility and a permissive bankruptcy system, media
reporting sometimes framed the omnibus bankruptcy issue as a
220
story of women and children. This frame developed with a highprofile op-ed in The New York Times by Professor Elizabeth
221
Warren. The women and children frame has two underlying
substantive components that should be noted here. First, women
collecting child support compete with institutional lenders, not
only in but after bankruptcy, and the omnibus bankruptcy bill

New York Times discarded its special law section and that weekly news magazines do not
cover law very much).
218. For example, Katharine Q. Seelye of the New York Times wrote twelve pieces on
bankruptcy—the most in the sample—during the period studied, but she also wrote on a
wide range of subjects including presidential campaigns, impeachment, terrorism, gun
control, environmental protection, and campaign finance. See e.g., Richard L. Berke &
Katharine Q. Seelye, Now, Democrats Take Turn at Abortion Fight, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30,
2000, at 1; Katharine Q. Seelye, A Tough Fight Ahead as Republicans Work to Keep
Control of the House, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8, 1999, at A20; Katharine Q. Seelye, Bradley
Proposes Revamping Federal Campaign Finance System, N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 1999, at
A19; Katharine Q. Seelye, Clinton Asks Hunters to Back His Proposals Curbing Guns,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 28, 1999, at A26; Katharine Q. Seelye, Clinton Tearfully Receives 10
Bodies, Praising Lives That “Nothing Can Erase”, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 14, 1998, at A10;
Katharine Q. Seelye, Gay Voters Finding G.O.P. Newly Receptive to Support, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 11, 1999, at A1; Katharine Q. Seelye, G.O.P.’s Hopes Dim for Filibuster-Proof Senate
Margin, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30, 1998, at A31; Katharine Q. Seelye, Hillary Clinton Appeals
for Gun Control Lobbying, N.Y. TIMES, May 9, 1999, at 25; Katharine Q. Seelye, Italian
Presses Clinton on Pilot’s Acquittal, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 1999, at A1; Katharine Q. Seelye,
Killings in Littleton Pierced Soul of the Nation, N.Y. TIMES, May 21, 1999, at A23;
Katharine Q. Seelye, Leading Environmentalists Put Support and Money Behind Gore,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 1999, at A24; Katharine Q. Seelye, Livingston Wants Early Close to It
All, If It Could Be Done”, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20, 1998, at A28; Katharine Q. Seelye, Low on
Cash, Dole Withdraws from G.O.P. Race, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 21, 1999, at A1; Katharine Q.
Seelye, Report Suggests Jordan Suspected Affair, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12, 1998, at A15;
Katharine Q. Seelye, Stumping as a Knowing Ally of Farmers, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22, 2000,
at A11; Katharine Q. Seelye, The Candidate Tied to the Decision, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 31,
1999, at A12. Later, Seelye even wrote about cities and fat burning. See Katharine Q.
Seelye, Cities Made for Walking May Be Fat Burners, N.Y. TIMES, June 20, 2003, at A16.
219. SCHUDSON, supra note 80, at 34 (stating that subjectivity in journalism results
from strict deadlines).
220. Cf. GÓMEZ, supra note 89, at 121 (discussing the transformation of the crack
baby problem from a narrow concern into a broader women’s problem).
221. Elizabeth Warren, Editorial, Bankrupt? Pay Your Child Support First, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 27, 1998, at A15 (describing how proposed legislation could give credit-card
debt the same priority as child support payments).
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strengthens the rights of those institutional lenders.222 Second,
although less prominent in the news reporting, single-filing
223
women are the fastest growing group of bankruptcy filers. The
hundreds of changes buried within the omnibus bankruptcy bill
would have a large and likely negative effect on these women and
their families.
A variety of stories mentioned the possibility that the
omnibus bankruptcy bill would adversely affect women and
224
children. The reporting attracted First Lady Hillary Rodham
225
Clinton’s attention, which in turn became a news media focus.
Women’s group representatives, by offering quotes in bankruptcy

222.
223.

See id.
See ELIZABETH WARREN & AMELIA WARREN TYAGI, THE TWO-INCOME TRAP: WHY
MIDDLE-CLASS MOTHERS AND FATHERS ARE GOING BROKE 97–122 (2003) (explaining that
the filing rate among single mothers has increased dramatically, but conceding that the
filing rate among divorced fathers is almost as alarming and that “filing for bankruptcy
may be the most responsible thing these divorced fathers can do for their children”);
Melissa B. Jacoby et al., Rethinking the Debates over Health Care Financing: Evidence
from the Bankruptcy Courts, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 375, 391 (2001) (describing the rapid
growth of the percentage of women filing singly and the implications for medical-related
bankruptcy); Oliver B. Pollak, Gender and Bankruptcy: An Empirical Analysis of Evolving
Trends in Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 Bankruptcy Filings 1996–1997, 102 COM. L.J. 333,
335 tbl.2, 336 (1997) (showing that the percentage of bankruptcy filings attributable to
women has increased since 1967); see also Karen Gross et al., Ladies in Red: Learning
from America’s First Female Bankrupts, 40 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 1, 14, 20 (1996) (stating
that the earliest female bankruptcy filers in the 1800s were predominantly single
women); Elizabeth Warren, What Is a Women’s Issue? Bankruptcy, Commercial Law, and
Other Gender-Neutral Topics, 25 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 19, 28 (2002) [hereinafter Warren,
What Is a Women’s Issue?] (finding that the number of women filing for bankruptcy
without a spouse has increased 800% since the early 1980s).
224. See, e.g., Day, Bankruptcy Legislation Still Faces Hurdles, supra note 144
(reporting on bill proponents’ defense of bill, claiming “backing from child-support
collection agencies around the country”); Stephen Labaton, Rights Groups Shift Battle to
New Front: Economic Issues, N.Y. TIMES, May 10, 1999, at A18 (“[T]he House of
Representatives passed a bill by a veto-proof margin that would make it much harder for
American families, particularly women and the elderly, to have their debts erased through
bankruptcy proceedings.” (emphasis added)); Morgan, Creditors’ Money, supra note 37
(discussing the effects of reform on women among list of reform opponents’ concerns); Pae,
supra note 130 (“[Children] would be reduced to no more than a piece of jewelry.” (quoting
Rep. Louise Slaughter (D-N.Y.))); Seelye, Vote on Measure to Tighten Bankruptcy, supra
note 125 (reporting that critics of the bill state that it would place credit-card companies
on the same plane as single parents recovering alimony or child support payments).
225. See HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, LIVING HISTORY 384–85 (2003) (discussing
involvement with women and children’s issue in the bankruptcy bill); WARREN & TYAGI,
supra note 223, at 123–26 (reporting that First Lady Clinton’s interest in talking to
Professor Warren and learning about bankruptcy stemmed from the New York Times oped); Hillary Rodham Clinton, Bankruptcy Shouldn’t Let Parents off the Hook, WASH.
TIMES, May 7, 1998, at A2 (stating that the “administration has worked too long and too
hard to improve child support collection to see it now threatened [by the bankruptcy
bill]”); see also Pae & Stoughton, supra note 125 (discussing Hillary Clinton’s concerns for
single parents); Seelye, First Lady in a Messy Fight, supra note 4 (reporting on the
private meeting between Hillary Clinton and Professor Warren about women’s issues).
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stories and writing letters to the editor, helped cement
bankruptcy’s relevance to their constituencies.226 One article
quoted Rep. Jerrold Nadler (D-N.Y.), a progressive Democrat
well-versed in bankruptcy, characterizing the bill as “‘Mom
227
Other media outlets outside the
versus Chemical Bank.’”
228
Article’s sample, such as USA Today, also used this frame.
News reports and editorials also framed bankruptcy
discussions in terms of the FACE abortion-protestor amendment,
which in turn heightened the gendered implications of
229
bankruptcy reform. This issue was particularly newsworthy
when Vice President Al Gore rushed from the presidential
campaign trail in case he was needed to cast the tie-breaking
230
vote in the Senate on this amendment.

226. See, e.g., Joan Entmacher, Letter to the Editor, Children, Bankruptcy, Creditors,
WASH. POST, June 22, 1999, at A16 (explaining that the bill gives greater priority to
commercial lenders after bankruptcy); Seelye, First Lady in a Messy Fight, supra note 4
(“‘There is a big stake in this for women and children,’ said Joan Entmacher, vice
president of the National Women’s Law Center in Washington. ‘It was a really critical role
that Mrs. Clinton played in having the White House insist that the final bill had to
protect those populations.’”).
227. Seelye, Vote on Measure to Tighten Bankruptcy, supra note 125.
228. See, e.g., Deeper in Debt, ECONOMIST, July 3, 1999, at 64, 64 (calling First Lady
Hillary Clinton the most vocal opponent of the bill and suggesting that she might
therefore be able to stop it); Christine Dugas, Critics Say Bankruptcy Bills Threaten Child
Support, USA TODAY, Apr. 30, 1998, at 1A (citing sources complaining that “‘the credit
industry will be taking money out of the pockets of women and children’”); Christine
Dugas, Women Rank 1st in Bankruptcy Filings, USA TODAY, June 21, 1999, at 1A
(quoting sources explaining that bankruptcy is a women’s issue and that bankruptcy
reform would have a particularly hard effect on women); Associated Press, Study Shows
Women Resorting to Bankruptcy More than Men, CHI. TRIB., June 22, 1999, at 4
(comparing different viewpoints on whether or not the legislation will hurt women);
Elizabeth Warren, The New Women’s Issue: Bankruptcy Law, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR,
Sept. 10, 1999, at 11, 11 (discussing how proposed legislation would negatively impact
“financially troubled families,” a group increasingly headed by women).
229. Dewar & Day, supra note 136 (quoting Sen. Patty Murray saying that the issue
is not about theater, but “‘about the very real issue of violence against women’”); Lois
Romano & Helen Dewar, Gore Rushes to Hill Abortion Vote, WASH. POST, Feb. 3, 2000, at
A14 (quoting Sen. Grassley, who characterized Gore’s trip back to Washington as
“‘theater’”). Refer to note 235–36 infra and accompanying text (providing examples of
reactions to tying the abortion issue to the bankruptcy bill). For reporting on President
Clinton’s position on the abortion provision, see Editorial, Bankruptcy Law and Violence,
N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 2000, at A30 (referring to the use of bankruptcy to discharge FACE
debts and expressing concern about this “increasingly popular loophole”); Day, House
Passes Tougher Debt Rules, supra note 126 (mentioning FACE Amendment as one of
President Clinton’s major concerns).
230. Katharine Q. Seelye, Gore Abortion Scramble, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3, 2000, at A20
(describing how Gore’s frantic return to Washington on a commercial airline was
unnecessary because the Republicans decided at the last minute to support the
amendment).
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1. Controversy? Although the use of this frame seems less
extensive in this sample, most who were involved with or
followed the bankruptcy bill’s development would likely agree
231
that this media frame sparked controversy. First Lady Hillary
Rodham Clinton’s interest, initially fueled by this framing,
contributed to the development of the Clinton Administration’s
232
position, including the pocket veto. More than thirty women’s
groups came out in opposition to a bill regarding an issue that
previously was not even on their radar screens and took their
concerns to the public, legislators, and the White House through
233
written commentary, meetings, testimony, and other avenues.
The legislative process slowed as lawmakers and staff had little
234
choice but to “solve” the women-and-children problem.

231. This approach also continued beyond the time period studied in this Article. See,
e.g., Elizabeth Warren, Editorial, A Quiet Attack on Women, N.Y. TIMES, May 20, 2002, at
A19 (describing the effects of the proposed bankruptcy legislation on women as
“devastating”).
232. See, e.g., Letter from Jacob J. Lew, Acting Director, Office of Management and
Budget, Executive Office of the President, to Hon. George W. Gekas (May 21, 1998)
(complaining that the bill puts credit-cards in competition with support obligations after
bankruptcy); Letter from Jacob J. Lew, Director, Office of Management and Budget,
Executive Office of the President, to Hon. Trent Lott (Oct. 9, 1998) (listing among reasons
for opposing bill, the bill’s increase of competition between credit-card lenders and
support recipients); Press Release, Office of the Press Secretary, The White House,
President Clinton Hails Child Support Progress and Signs into Law Tough New Penalties
for Deadbeat Parents (June 24, 1998) (“[T]he President will reiterate his position that
bankruptcy reform legislation should not make it harder to collect child support and
alimony.”); Radio Address of the President to the Nation (Office of the Press Secretary,
The White House, radio broadcast, May 9, 1998) (criticizing bankruptcy bill, in honor of
Mother’s Day, for forcing mothers “to compete with powerful banks and credit card
companies”); Statement of Administration Policy on H.R. 3150, supra note 42 (basing
opposition to house bill in part on the fact that increased credit-card nondischargeability
would adversely affect domestic support recipients).
233. See, e.g., Letter from Patricia Ireland, President, NOW, to Hon. John Conyers
Jr. and Hon. Jerrold Nadler (May 15, 1998) (on file with the Houston Law Review)
(opposing legislation); Letter from the National Partnership for Women and Families, to
U.S. Representatives (June 9, 1998) (expressing “deep concerns” about House Bill 3150
because of its effects on women as debtors and as creditors); Letter from National
Women’s Law Center and National Partnership for Women and Families, to U.S. Senate
(Sept. 17, 1999) (regarding Senate Bill 625 and its potential impact on women who file for
bankruptcy); Letter from National Women’s Law Center and National Partnership for
Women and Families, to U.S. Senators (June 24, 1999); Press Release, NOW Action Alert,
Changes in Bankruptcy Law Bad News for Women, at http://www.now.org/issues/
economic/alerts/04-24-98.html (Apr. 24, 1998) (urging women’s advocates to oppose Senate
Bill 1301); Press Release, NOW, NOW Warns Senate and Credit Card Companies:
“Bankruptcy Legislation Will Harm Women, Children, Retirees” (May 2, 2000)
(commenting on both the child support and the abortion issues).
234. See Letter from 31 Senators, U.S. Senate, to Hon. Orrin Hatch, Chairman, and
Hon. Patrick Leahy, Ranking Member, Senate Judiciary Committee (May 5, 1998) (on file
with the Houston Law Review) (“We are particularly concerned with the impact of the
proposed legislation on children and single parents and urge you to eliminate provisions
that harm these vulnerable families.”).
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The media also may have helped attract additional attention
to the FACE amendment, which of course was inherently
235
controversial. This issue has not only delayed the bill’s passage,
but also prompted organizations such as the United States
Conference of Catholic Bishops to take a position on bankruptcy
236
legislation.
2. Improvement? This frame affected the contents of the
bill. After initially denying any adverse effects, bill proponents
quickly shifted course and added provisions directed toward child
237
Governmental collection
support collection in bankruptcy.
238
agencies and select others lauded the amendments, leading bill
proponents to describe the bill as helpful to women and

235. See, e.g., Nunez & Rosenthal, supra note 178 (describing the abortion
amendment as an issue that can be used strategically to sink legislation); Letter from
Gene Sperling, National Economic Advisor, to Hon. Trent Lott (Sept. 22, 2000)
(explaining that President Clinton “will not sign any legislation that does not contain an
effective means to ensure accountability and responsibility of perpetrators of clinic
violence”). Refer to Part II.C supra. For a politically charged entanglement of another
women’s issue with the bankruptcy legislation, see 146 CONG. REC. 8097 (2000)
(statement of Rep. Nadler) (reacting to proposal to tie Violence Against Women Act
reauthorization to bankruptcy legislation, “I urge the other body to not use battered,
abused, and murdered women, who do not have the millions to lobby Congress, to give a
gift to the banks and creditors”).
236. Office of Gov’t Liaison, U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops, Our Legislative
Concerns in the 108th Congress, at http://www.usccb.org/ogl/prolife.htm (Jan. 6, 2004)
(stating that the conference “oppose[s] provisions that would deny bankruptcy protection
to abortion protesters”).
237. H.R. 975, 108th Cong. §§ 211–219 (2003) (proposing various amendments
relating to child support obligations).
238. See, e.g., Letter from Joel Bankes, Executive Director, National Child Support
Enforcement Association, to U.S. Senators (Sept. 4, 1998) (on file with the Houston Law
Review) (stating that the bill promotes support collection); Letter from Jonathan Burris,
President, California Family Support Council, to Hon. George W. Gekas (June 4, 1998)
(on file with the Houston Law Review) (positing that the bill “contains a veritable ‘wish
list’” of improvements for support obligations); Letter from Heidi Heitcamp, Chair,
National Association of Attorneys General Bankruptcy and Taxation Working Group, to
Senator Orrin G. Hatch & Senator Patrick J. Leahy (July 30, 1998) (on file with the
Houston Law Review) (applauding provisions that ensure child support collection, but
expressing some concerns); Letter from Michael D. Hess, Corporation Counsel of the City
of New York, to Hon. George W. Gekas (June 5, 1998) (on file with the Houston Law
Review) (complementing bill’s improvement in treatment of support recipients); Letter
from John R. Justice, President, National District Attorneys Association, to Hon. Trent
Lott (Sept. 2, 1998) (on file with the Houston Law Review) (stating that the bill helps
collect support). But see Letter from Richard Blumenthal, Attorney General, State of
Connecticut, to Hon. Jerrold Nadler (July 24, 1998) (on file with the Houston Law Review)
(supporting child support provisions but opposing anticonsumer legislation overall);
Letter from Geraldine Jensen, Association for Children for Enforcement of Support, to
Hon. George W. Gekas (Mar. 17, 1999) (on file with the Houston Law Review) (supporting
parts of the bill but expressing other concerns about keeping bankruptcy accessible for
spouses who need bankruptcy after not receiving support).
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children239 and to denounce President Clinton’s pocket veto of the
240
bill as “a blow to women and children everywhere.” Others
would contend that these amendments were not responsive to the
concerns raised in the press, and in some respects were rather
241
superficial.
Aside from the support amendments, however, there is
reason to believe this frame ultimately encouraged the omission
or limitation of some provisions that were particularly beneficial
to the credit industry. For example, early versions of the bill
substantially expanded the nondischargeability of credit-card
242
debt. After complaints that these provisions hampered the
collection of child support and alimony, some of these
nondischargeability provisions were watered down and even
omitted in amendments designated as having implications for
243
women and children.
3. Educational Value? Bill supporters claimed that this
244
frame was contrived and disingenuous. Notwithstanding their
239. See, e.g., Rep. Bill McCollum, Bankruptcy Reform: A Return to Responsibility,
HILL, May 20, 1998, at 38 (“Contrary to [news coverage], H.R. 3150 strengthens an exspouse’s ability to recover child support and alimony . . . .”); News Release, Gekas
Bankruptcy Bill Passes House: Measure Will Protect Consumers and Reduce Fraud (Mar.
31, 2001) (stating that the “reform bill brings increased protection for women and children
who are left destitute” when their ex-spouses file for bankruptcy).
240. Press Release, Rep. George W. Gekas, Gekas Denounces Clinton Pocket Veto of
Bankruptcy Reform: Gekas Encouraged by Bush Administration (Dec. 21, 2000) (on file
with the Houston Law Review).
241. For a detailed discussion, see Warren, What Is a Women’s Issue?, supra note
223, at 21, 39–42; Will Bankruptcy Reform Help Women and Children?, CONSUMER
BANKR. NEWS, May 31, 2001, at 9, 9 (reporting that women’s groups see the bill as
“window dressing on an empty house”); see also 147 CONG. REC. S2334–35 (2001) (Letter
from 91 Law Professors) (criticizing the omnibus bankruptcy bill because alleged
problems affecting women and children have not been fixed).
242. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1998, H.R. 3150, 105th Cong. § 141 (as introduced on
Feb. 3, 1998); see also Memorandum from Robin Jeweler, American Law Division,
Congressional Research Service, Impact of Consumer Bankruptcy Reform Proposals on
Child Support Obligations 4 (May 13, 1998) (on file with the Houston Law Review)
(discussing additional categories of nondischargeable debt in bankruptcy bill). Refer to
note 232 supra (providing examples from the Clinton Administration that criticize the
effects of the bankruptcy bill on child support recipients).
243. See, e.g., Boxer Amendment, S. 108, 147 CONG. REC. S2415 (2001) (proposing
changes to Senate Bill 420). Along the same lines, the involvement of women’s groups
probably helped limit the scope of a provision in the bill that substantially enhanced the
treatment of secured creditors in Chapter 13 plans. Leahy Amendment, S. 105, 147 CONG.
REC. S2348 (2001) (reducing the automotive debt “cramdown” period from five years to
three, consistent with the requests of women’s groups).
244. Letter from John R. Justice, President, National District Attorneys Association,
to Hon. Trent Lott (Sept. 2, 1998) (on file with the Houston Law Review) (calling critics of
legislation either “disingenuous” or lacking knowledge of the child support collection
process). Judge Jones asserts that the USA Today quotes of Professors Elizabeth Warren
and Ken Klee were a
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reaction, this frame arguably was the most educational of those
described in this Article.
General audience discussions tend to conceptualize
bankruptcy and debtor-creditor law in terms of debtor versus
creditor, downplaying or disregarding the competition between
creditors. Yet in bankruptcy, many types of creditors have long
competed with each other over hopelessly meager assets or
245
future income. Enhancements to one creditor’s entitlements
inevitably have distributional consequences, and the women and
children frame brought this issue to the forefront. If we have not
given up hope of a reasonably informed discourse about legal
systems and proposals to change them, it is important that the
public and lawmakers understand this dynamic in the debtorcreditor system.
This frame also had the potential to teach the public that
women continue to face serious financial trouble even though
246
they have made many major advances. The public benefits from
blatant misrepresentation of the bills and current bankruptcy law. I think we all
have a right to expect more expertise and candor from tenured professors at two
of our nation’s outstanding law schools than are displayed in these statements.
....
. . . Professors Klee and Warren are not attempting to be precise, only to
be obstructionist.
Letter from Hon. Edith H. Jones, to Hon. Orrin C. Hatch, Hon. Charles E. Grassley, Hon.
Henry J. Hyde, and Hon. George W. Gekas 1, 3 (Apr. 30, 1998) (on file with the Houston
Law Review); Bill McCollum, Letter to the Editor, Bankruptcy Reform, N.Y. TIMES, May
3, 1998, at A16 (stating that Professor Warren’s claims were “false,” asserting that
Professor Warren “opposes reforms that would return responsibility to bankruptcy,” and
arguing that Professor Warren “offers no reason why she believes that middle-class
families should bear the burden for irresponsible higher income borrowers”); “Dear
Colleague” Letter from Reps. George W. Gekas, Rick Boucher, Bill McCollum, and James
F. Moran (Apr. 2, 1998) (stating that the “attempt by opponents of bankruptcy reform to
create confusion in the minds of Congress and the American public by raising the
emotionally charged issue of unpaid child support is merely a smokescreen”); see also
David Frum, Bankruptcy Reform Is a Moral Issue, WALL ST. J., Feb. 11, 2000, at A14
(noting sarcastically that we should now expect to hear that women will be burdened by
this legislation); Hiatt, supra note 204 (noting that bill opponents had difficulty
countering bill’s rhetoric until they “came up with the widows-and-children argument
(updated for our era to divorcees-and-children)”); Letter from Rep. Bill McCollum et al., to
President William J. Clinton (May 11, 1998) (on file with the Houston Law Review)
(writing to “correct any misinformation” expressed in his radio address and to “assure
[him] that this is false”).
245. A Statement of the Interest of Creditors in a Bankruptcy Case: Hearing on H.R.
833 Before the House Subcomm. on Commercial and Admin. Law of the Comm. on the
Judiciary, 106th Cong. (Mar. 16, 1999) (testimony of Leon S. Forman, esq.)
(“Enhancement of the treatment of one type of creditor often comes at the cost of
another.”); JAMES ANGELL MACLACHLAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF BANKRUPTCY 57, 381
(1956) (explaining how creditors jockey for position and contest one another’s claims).
246. See generally WARREN & TYAGI, supra note 223, at 97–122 (concluding that
“despite all the progress, middle-class single mothers are no more financially secure today
than they were a generation ago”).
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learning about the interplay between bankruptcy, financial
distress, and other socioeconomic problems.247 Framing the
bankruptcy debate in terms of women and children had the
potential to advance that educational goal.
To be sure, the media rarely presented these points in fine
detail, but the frame attracted the attention of those with a
special interest in these issues. Thus, once exposed to a general
conception of the problem, readers could educate themselves
further about how current bankruptcy law really works and how
248
the legislation would change the system.
IV. CONCLUSION
This Article has explored the roles of the media in legislative
development with a specific focus on the lingering omnibus
bankruptcy bill. I cannot prove causation, but the analysis
suggests that the news media interacted with the legislative
process, and, in some instances, may have altered the course of
deliberations. In light of the academic literature on the role of
249
sources in news reporting, it is possible that some opposed to
the legislation who were denied seats at the Congressional
250
bargaining table found an indirect method of participation. If
that is the case, the news media’s role in the legislative process
may include giving a voice to otherwise-excluded parties.
Because evaluating the consequences of news coverage is a
more complex inquiry, however, this is not entirely an
empowering story. Negotiating legislation through the news
media is a time consuming enterprise, requiring immediate
251
responsiveness to reporters who seek one’s input and reaching

247. Jacoby et al., supra note 223, at 391 (describing the rapid growth of the
percentage of women filing singly and the implications for medical-related bankruptcy);
Pollak, supra note 223, at 336 (discussing sociological issues and filing rates among
women); see also Gross et al., supra note 223, at 20–21 (providing the demographic
characteristics of America’s earliest female debtors). See generally Warren, What Is a
Women’s Issue, supra note 223, at 28 (reporting on single filing women in bankruptcy).
248. The Author’s files and e-mail archives include dozens of communications
involving women’s groups seeking to understand bankruptcy law and legislation and to
communicate their concerns to others. See Nat’l Women’s Law Ctr., Bankruptcy Bill:
Harsh on Economically Vulnerable Women and Families, Tolerant of Abuses by
Perpetrators of Clinic Violence (Mar. 2003) (on file with the Houston Law Review)
(presenting a detailed discussion of the bankruptcy bill and its effects on women).
249. Refer to notes 111–17 supra and accompanying text.
250. Refer to notes 2–7 supra and accompanying text (describing the bankruptcy
establishment’s involvement with the reform bill).
251. Walsh, supra note 83, at 14 (explaining the importance of returning media calls
extremely promptly).
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out to reporters who do not.252 Due to journalistic conventions,
experts who make the commitment and the connections still
must refrain from comments and complaints heavy on substance
253
and legal details if they wish to be heard. With respect to
legislation as dense and incomprehensible as the omnibus
bankruptcy bill, this means that legitimate concerns about the
drafting and effects may never enter the public discourse at all.
Complexity becomes a convenient cloak for policy decisions.
Without a forum to explain complex issues, expert sources
must either find more salient and thematic ways to expose these
problems or, more likely, simply attempt to increase the
controversy of legislation they find troubling. Yet even if a source
actively and successfully participates in framing an issue in a
controversial fashion, that source cannot control the
consequences. For example, those who may have helped frame
bankruptcy in terms of loopholes for the rich probably do not
relish the fact that the reporting unduly emphasizes the rich and
famous, nor do they likely approve of the compromises the
lawmakers reached. Those who helped frame bankruptcy as an
issue of women and children may have been surprised by the
ultimate reaction—the addition to the bill of an entire section of
domestic support collection amendments having little to do with
the concerns raised in the press.
These limits notwithstanding, researchers in other
disciplines have long recognized and closely examined the
relevance of the news media to law. Lawyers and law professors
with interest in the legislative process or legislative-intense
subjects have much to gain from joining in the study of this
important relationship.

252. See, e.g., WEISS & SINGER, supra note 111, at 26–28 (describing how reaching
out to the media via press releases can be effective); SIGAL, supra note 111, at 104–07
(explaining how extensively reporter rely on press conferences and press releases as
sources for news stories); see also Colbert, supra note 115, at 556–57 (discussing the
success of a professor in gaining media attention for his capital trial error rate study).
253. WEISS & SINGER, supra note 111, at 47 (describing the ideal news source as
cooperative, concise, and straightforward).

